NORAD ‘renewal’ has recently been making news, especially as US President Biden, in his first ‘virtual meeting’ with Prime Minister Trudeau, is reported to have raised the issue. It should be noted that the NORAD agreement does not have a fixed date for renewal as it did for many years, on ten-year intervals. At its last formal renewal, the two governments decided that the agreement should be extended indefinitely, with a five-year review process. During a review, some amendments to the agreement might be agreed and at that point, the agreement would go through each country’s treaty process to incorporate the desired changes. Of course, like all Canadian treaties, a standard withdrawal clause remains in the text.

 So, we are not discussing the diplomatic/legal process of extending or modifying the agreement. What the President and Prime Minister were referring to are the ongoing studies that were launched in the last bilateral review of the agreement to renew the technological base of NORAD. In particular, the North Warning System, dating from the late 1980’s, is fast approaching the end of both its functional life and its ability to provide the capability required to counter a new generation of nuclear weapons and new ideas for their use. Decision time is approaching and without question the price tag will not be negligible. (Jockel, 2007, for a concise history of NORAD).

But why is this Cold War defence system, albeit for over six decades at the centre of the Canada-USA defence relationship, now in need of a major renewal when some more modest upgrades might support an air defence mission focused on aerial sovereignty and counter-terrorism? In fact, the Canadian Government’s intentions regarding the defence of North America, our defence relationship with the U.S. and NORAD in particular are stated in its defence policy statement, Strong, Secure, Engaged (SSE 2017). There is no change in the priority assigned to the defence of North America and NORAD from previous defence policy documents, which is ranked second only to the defence of Canada itself.

 SSE does state that Canada will fulfill its NORAD obligations “with new capacity in some areas” and “modernize NORAD to meet existing challenges and evolving threats to North America, taking into account the full range of threats.” (SSE 2017. 90) SSE indicates that the resources will be available when required. To better understand the impetus for significantly modernising NORAD, we will examine the context of contemporary deterrence, the evolving Russian doctrine for the use of nuclear weapons, and technological developments that are outpacing NORAD’s existing technological base.

The Changing Understanding of Deterrence

Deterrence has always been more complex than the simplistic invocation of Mutually Assured Destruction or the Gorbachev – Reagan declarations that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. As far back as the 1980’s, advancements in precision guidance led some strategists to observe that a new generation of precision conventional weapons could effectively strike key targets hitherto included in nuclear targeting plans. (Krepinevich 2019, 38) More recently, advances in very low yield nuclear weapons may have made them more useable. Defined escalation ladders have therefore been superseded by “cross-cutting conventional and strategic (nuclear) escalation paths,” which present new challenges to the warning systems and defences (Krepinevich 2009, 78-80).

Russia

Beginning in the late 1960’s, successful U.S.-U.S.S.R. arms control negotiations clarified the mutual understanding of deterrence while placing limits and then reductions, on the two superpowers’ massive arsenals. However, under President Putin, Russia has articulated a revisionist foreign policy heavily influenced by NATO’s expansion, its suppression of Serbia in the 1999 Balkan war and its support for an anti-Russian Colour Revolution regime change in Ukraine. Russian doctrine thus draws upon its historical memories of invasion as well as its fear of American and Allied capability to destabilise Russia through precision conventional strikes on its strategic weapons, command and control nodes and leadership and thus gain a decisive advantage in any regional conflict in its neighbourhood (Steil, 2018). In response, for the better part of a decade, Russian defence ministers and senior military officers have articulated a doctrine commonly described as “escalate to de-escalate.” While some academic observers and journalists have discounted the meaning of the expressed doctrine, most analysts – especially those linked to NATO states – do not (Zysk 2018, 4).

Implementation of the Russian doctrine would begin with warnings expressed through diplomatic channels followed by public statements to the effect that Russia will react unless the status quo ante is restored. Movements of assets and exercises, visible to adversarial monitoring, would strengthen the warning. Intimidation tactics, such as close approaches to national borders or even overflights might follow. At a certain point, a limited conventional strike might be employed, followed by a low-yield nuclear strike, probably on a target where few individuals would be killed. Should the desired effect not be achieved, at that point, Russia might choose to execute a limited nuclear strike with low yield weapons against military targets, escalating to carefully selected key civilian economic and infrastructure targets. The latter is sometimes described as “strategic operations to destroy critically important targets,” intended to arouse public opinion favouring a stand-down in the face of Russian determination. At every stage, intense public messaging plus cyber harassment would be employed (Zysk 2018, 7).

Whatever the finer points of deterrence/escalation theory may be, Russian military modernisation has placed high priority on the necessary precision long-range conventional and nuclear weapons. In particular, the Long Range Aviation (LRA), far from being a moribund Cold War relic, has received extensive modernisations of its two strategic bombers, the Tu-95MS (NATO reporting name Bear-H) and the Tu-160 (Blackjack); the Tu-160 has been placed back into production to replace the Bears. An entirely new strategic bomber is under development. (SIPRI Yearbook 2018. 244) A major part of the modernisation has been the deployment of a new ALCM (air launched cruise missile), with two variants, the Kh-101 (conventional) and Kh-102 (nuclear). They have been allocated the NATO Reporting Name AS-23 Kodiak. The AS-23 is estimated to have 2,500 to 2,800 km range, capable of extremely precise targeting and very difficult to detect and intercept. (Zysk 2018, 8) The Russian Navy’s most modern nuclear attack submarines as well as its modern diesel-electric submarines are being equipped with the SS-N-30 Kalibr Land Attack Cruise Missile (LACM), with a range of 2,500 km. (CSIS Missile Defense Project, 2018. “Missiles of Russia;” SIPRI, 249-250) Russia has announced development of several hypersonic missiles; as their capabilities are not yet known, their strategic significance remains to be assessed.

The conflict in Syria has provided an occasion for the practical implementation of the doctrine. Syria, with its Russian naval base, has long been seen in Moscow as a strategically important ally, providing Russia with the ability to deploy a naval presence on the Mediterranean, among other strategic benefits, as noted by Andrew Parasiliti, director of the Center for Global Risk and Security at the RAND Corporation, cited by Ann Simmons in the Los Angeles Times, April 6, 2017.   At various times, LRA Bears and Blackjacks, along with the LRA’s medium bomber, Backfire-C, have launched volleys of the new ALCMs against ISIS and rebel targets. Russian submarines have also launched Kalibr LACMs. A reasonable conclusion in Moscow would be that the escalation doctrine has now been successfully implemented: President Trump first took great care to avoid inadvertent U.S.-Russia clashes and reduced the U.S. presence in that theatre.

For NORAD, the re-emergence of a potentially effective Russian threat has brought the Command full circle. The LRA’s operations in the Arctic, approaching U.S. and Canadian airspace (but not violating internationally agreed borders) appear to be realistic and systematic exercises of the LRA / AS-23 capacity to launch limited strikes against North America as foreseen in the escalation doctrine. NORAD’s capacity to warn of, and blunt limited strikes is deemed essential to provide the U.S. leadership with the opportunity to tailor, for example, a diplomatic response combined with minimal conventional retaliation rather than an immediate nuclear strike, which, however small, could accelerate the dynamics of escalation. The new concepts of escalation and deterrence, combined with technological advances, such as hypersonic missiles, place a renewed emphasis on early warning and attack assessment, missions at the heart of modern-day NORAD that now require new approaches.

China

China has, for over a decade, been pursuing a massive transformation of its large but old-fashioned military to produce a technologically advanced, agile and professional force capable of projecting power beyond China’s traditional sphere of influence.  Part of this effort is the expansion and modernization of its strategic nuclear forces with a new generation of land-based ICBMs and ballistic missile submarines. Following the example of the U.S. and Russia, China has begun a program for a long-range strategic bomber with conventional and nuclear precision strike capabilities possibly embodied in a new generation of ALCMs. (SIPRI Yearbook 2018. 266) This capability could allow China to conduct both conventional and limited nuclear operations with a high degree of precision as a tool in crisis management and intimidation. (SIPRI Yearbook 2018. 261)

The “Rogue Nation” Threats

North Korea and Iran pose lesser threats, but the former has attained nuclear weapons status and a basic (and as yet not fully developed) ICBM capability in unknown but small numbers. Iran continues to progress in its regional ballistic missile programs but has not yet perfected an ICBM. These two states amply demonstrate the kind of risks posed by proliferation. Perhaps of more concern is the proliferation of cruise missiles to countries of concern and / or non-state actors. Many of these are dual capable and can be targeted with a high degree of accuracy; Michael Stott reported for Reuters in 2010 that Russia has offered for sale a “cruise missile – the SS-N-30, in a shipping container.” This concept could appeal to non-state actors such as Hizbollah or countries seeking an asymmetrical counter to U.S. superiority. Other arms suppliers have offered similar systems.

Finally, the terrorist threat persists. Although recent attacks in various countries have been carried out by small numbers of attackers or individuals, the 9 / 11 model is still a concern if for no other reasons than the shock effect of a mass casualty attack and the inevitable economic losses which would follow.

Conclusion

Russia’s technological advances and its articulation of a different concept of deterrence do not point to an inevitable war. Nor does China’s strategic modernisation. Intent is more difficult to gauge and both Russia and China are very skilled at conducting conflict at a level below the kinetic threshold. Their force developments give them the capability for intimidation, but it should be clear that such tactics are inherently risky. North Korea is a different case but it, too, appears willing to push the limits of threats and intimidation.

In this context, NORAD’s traditional missions of warning and attack assessment are as vital as ever and may be even more essential in situations where adversaries may be intent on signaling possibly hostile intentions but just short of outright war. The risk of accidental war in the era of “escalate to de-escalate” remains very significant. Canada has declared its intent to join in the NORAD modernisation effort; the viability of our defence relationship with the United States will depend upon assuming our national share of the burden and carrying forward NORAD’s plans.

This article contains excerpts from a paper (NORAD: Remaining Relevant) originally published by the University of Calgary, School of Public Policy Publications in November 2019:  http://www.policyschool.ca/publications/

References

 

Center for Strategic and International Studies. 2018. Missile Defense Project: “Missiles of Russia” Accessed July 1, 2019. https://missilethreat.CSIS.org

 

Jockel, Joseph. 2007.  NORAD 1957-2007: A History. Montreal and Kingston. McGill-Queen’s University Press.

 

Krepinevich, Andrew F., Jr. 2019. The Decline of Deterrence.  Washington DC. The Hudson Institute.

 

Minister of National Defence. 2017.   Strong, Secure, Engaged: Canada’s Defence Policy.  Ottawa.

 

North American Aerospace Defence Command. 2019. “NORAD Missions.” Accessed March 10, 2019. https://www.norad.mil/About NORAD

 

Simmons, Ann. 2017. “Russia has been Assad’s greatest ally- as it was to his father before him.” Los Angeles Times,  April 26. Accessed at https://www.LAtimes.com/world/middleeast/la-fg-syria-russia-20170406-story.html.

 

SIPRI Yearbook 2018: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security. “Chapter 6: World Nuclear Forces.” Accessed June 30, 2019.  www.sipriyearbook.org

 

Stott, Michael. 2010. “Deadly new Russian weapon hides in shipping containers.” Reuters, April 26, 2010. Accessed at https://www.reuters.com/article/US-russia-weapons-industrep2xb20100426.

 

Zysk, Katarzyna. 2018. “Escalation and Nuclear Weapons in Russia’s Military Strategy.” The RUSI Journal, 163:2: 4-15.

https://doi.org/10.1080/03071847.2018.1469267.  Zysk is Head of Research and Deputy Director of the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies, part of the Norwegian Defence University College, Oslo