“Operational success in the pan-domain reality demands an adaptation of not just Canadian Army C4I systems and architecture—it will have structural, procedural, and governance implications related to data management, artificial intelligence, and even how the Canadian Army will field new capabilities, train, and make decisions. It will demand change to culture driven by leaders. The digital sphere implicates processes, practices, and technologies related to the production, storage, processing, dissemination, and exchange of electronic information and data.”
Advancing with Purpose – The Modernisation of the Canadian Army
The premise for this article is that artificial intelligence (AI), including machine learning, is the solution to dealing with the risk that modern C4ISR systems produce too much information for humans to absorb during the decision-making process. I write this article, based largely on my 34 years of service, much of it spent working in headquarters at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels, including experiences working in deployed HQs on six expeditionary and one major domestic operation. Since retired from the CAF, I have worked for three major industry partners supporting the delivery of the Canadian Army’s C4ISR capability ambitions. To understand the role and benefit of AI in dealing with the potential information overload risk in deployed tactical HQs, I will first look at the function of a tactical HQ, the inputs that risk overloading commanders and their staffs, and the role AI could play in mitigating this risk.
The Tactical HQ and Its Operating Environment
There are a few realities that all those trying to improve the effectiveness of tactical HQs need to acknowledge: First, an HQ is made up of commanders and staffs (people), technology (computers, communication systems, software applications, etcetera), and staff processes. The HQ’s role is to support the commander in commanding; command is a human function governed by several elements including laws, orders, experiences, personalities, and traditions. Finally, a tactical HQ must be able to continue to execute command and control regardless of enemy action (cyber or physical attack) or technical failure; there must be alternate means to ensure continuous command and control of the unit or formation.
Starting with the view of the Brigade as a Platform (Vanguard January 2019), the networks form the central nervous system of a brigade and its integral units with the headquarters, the commander, and supporting staff, being the brain of the formation. This idea scales down to units and subunits and up to larger formations and Task Forces. The role of the headquarters, in simple terms, is to plan, direct and monitor all operations conducted by the brigade. The real complexity is created as the brigade is expected to operate in a pan-domain environment and must consider the full range of land, air, maritime, space, cyberspace capabilities, while working with joint, interagency, and multinational partners.
The challenges in today’s deployed HQs are not just the volume of data but the multiple sources of data – subordinate units, coalition, and inter-agency partners, media, and national, coalition, and integral intelligence elements. In addition to the range of different sources, the data arrives in multiple formats – text, both structured and unstructured, video, photos, and voice. Further, different sources have different levels of confidence or reliability and frequently, different data sets represent the same information, entity, or event. Finally, there is the risk of missing data, or worse, believing that there is required data missing, causing staff to take time searching for additional data. Despite all of this, commanders must make decisions and issue direction in an increasingly predictive manner to ensure their troops are able to operate inside of the adversary’s Observe, Orient, Decide, Act (OODA) loop. The challenges of working in this environment must not be underestimated, the continued effectiveness of tactical HQs will require the optimisation of the people, processes, and technology – AI could be part of the technology component.
Artificial Intelligence
AI, in simple terms, is the theory and development of computer systems and algorithms able to perform tasks that normally require human intelligence, such as visual perception, speech recognition, decision-making, and translation between languages. Machine Learning (ML) is a form of AI. Common examples of AI include internet search engines, such as Google, image recognition applications, personal assistants such as Siri and Alexa, and autonomous vehicles. As outlined in the Canadian Army publication Advancing with Purpose – The Canadian Army Modernization Strategy, AI is a key technology in the Army’s digital transformation, enabling an increasingly deliberate approach to managing data and exploiting it for decision making. It is anticipated that AI will transform some aspects of land operations, including exploiting data and information to produce intelligence and predictive modelling to support decision-making, both important functions of tactical HQs. This will lead to an information advantage in military operations, gained through the integration and aggregation of high-quality data from a wide variety of internal and external sources. The aim is to ensure commanders at all levels have access to the data they need to inform decision-making and improve operational effectiveness at the speed of relevance.
Headquarters Requirements and AI
To understand how AI could ease the data burden on a tactical HQ, a brief discussion of the raison d’etre of these HQs and its inputs will provide context to the risk of data overload. Tactical HQs track and manage current operations and plan future operations, relying on many forms of data to fulfil these functions. The key tool in a tactical HQ is the map, ideally, an electronic one but paper maps are still commonplace. The data being monitored and analysed includes the status of all friendly military forces including coalition partners (own forces), the status of observed and reported adversary forces, supporting interagency elements, other mission partners, neutral players such as aid agencies, and local populations. Additionally, data on terrain, meteorological, equipment capabilities, partner and adversary capabilities, and intentions and media, plus many other types of data, are tracked by tactical HQs.
A commander is supported by a staff, a variety of tools, both manual and automated, and processes and procedures. The staff is organised into a specific structure, in Canada the continental staff system is used with G/J 1 through 9 supported by specialist staff. The commander and staff are trained on the tools and processes used within a tactical HQ, a requirement that is continuous. Finally, both commanders and staff are shaped by their individual and collective experiences and beliefs. The human dimension adds yet another layer of complexity to the analysis of data as we all view data through the lenses of our experiences.
In addition to the people and processes, a tactical HQ relies on battle management systems (BMS) to store, manipulate, analyse and view data. Like any computer system, a BMS requires training to be an effective tool. A major challenge today is there are multiple BMSs found in a tactical HQ and the level of training varies from system to system. Frequently, these systems are not integrated, relying on a ‘swivel chair’ to move data from one system to another and, since data is in multiple systems, there is no common view, referred to as a common operating picture. This adds a significant burden to the staff working in a tactical HQ, compounding the data overload risk and potentially compromises the ability of commanders to make timely and effective decisions.
Another challenge related to technology is the need for CAF members to plan, deploy and manage these systems. The ability of the CAF to train operators and technicians will constrain the degree to which technical solutions can be employed in tactical HQs.
The first step to mitigating the data overload risk in a tactical HQ is to develop an integrated solution for the BMS. A capable BMS will provide the following functionality:
- Integrated Geographical Information System (GIS) that supports standard military symbology and graphics. It should also include geospatial analysis tools and display management.
- Current operational picture (COP) display and management.
- Tools to support plan development and management.
- Tools to support orders production, including annexes and appendixes.
- Speciality tools to support logistics and other speciality function planning.
- Support communications between other tactical HQs (national and coalition).
- Support interoperability using standards such as MIP, NFFI, FFI, Link 16, VMF, and other international data exchange standards.
A common BMS employed at different levels of command will reduce the training burden and will help ensure a commonality of data throughout the network. Common systems and processes, especially between coalition partners, also facilitates interoperability, easing the sharing of data. Finally, the BMS must be synchronised with HQ processes, governed by appropriate policies and all users must be fully trained on how to use the BMS.
With an effective BMS in place, consideration can be given to augmenting it with AI tools. As stated above, AI is viewed as a means to improve data exploitation for enhanced operational effectiveness. The first area is in managing data conflicts. On the modern battlefield, there is a myriad of sensors and in Canada’s case, most of the new equipment fleets recently brought into service or about to be brought into service include sensors and tracking systems. Each will detect and track objects within their range of operation often with overlapping coverage areas resulting in the same track being detected and reported multiple times. These duplicated tracks and events, reported as individual events, results in a cluttered and confused picture for commanders and staff. AI provides an effective tool to correlate and fuse tracks and events to provide a clean situational picture. Further, AI has proven effective in managing video and photo data to quickly identify relevant information. These AI tools can be used throughout the information chain, starting with individual sensors to identify the desired information needs. Also, this has the advantage of reducing the demand on the communications systems, speeding up the transmission of relevant data to decision-makers. Throughout this process, there must be an ability to manually override the AI processes to ensure the requirement for a human in or on “the loop” remains for any application of lethal force. Similar AI tools can also be used to integrate data from multiple sources in a tactical HQ to produce a coherent recognised maritime picture, recognised air picture, and recognised land picture, depending on the need with increased speed and accuracy and reduced manpower. This ensures optimal situational awareness for the commander’s decision-making process.
The second area identified to benefit from AI within a tactical HQ is planning. Emerging advances in artificial intelligence, such as its use within predictive planning tools, has the potential to greatly shorten the decision-action cycle. An important part of the planning process is the comparison of different courses of action and the refinement of the selected course of action. One tool used to support this is wargaming using computer/algorithm-driven models; the application of AI could greatly enhance and accelerate the wargaming process, allowing for a greater number of iterations to compare and select the best course of action (COA) and the refinement of the selected COA. Also, AI can enhance other aspects of planning that are computational, and rules-based such as logistic planning, movement planning, aspects of engineering planning, and fire planning to name a few.
Although I have focused on the potential for AI in a tactical HQ, the application of AI will be of great value to the wider CAF digital transformation, enhancing their ability to force generate forces, to include HQs to meet assigned missions, potentially reduce the number of systems required, reducing the burden of managing these systems in the tactical HQ. There are also programs that have used AI to aid training, reducing the time required for training.
A final consideration for integrating AI, or any technology, into a tactical HQ is the risk of interference from enemy actions or technical failures and staff must maintain the ability to continue operations despite this interference. Alternate systems and manual processes must continue to exist.
Conclusion
Tactical HQs form the ‘brain’ of deployed forces, responsible for supporting a commander in the execution of command. The tactical HQ is responsible for monitoring ongoing operations and planning all aspects of future operations. This requires the ability to collect, analyse and store significant amounts of data and the myriad of data available from modern sensor systems and coalition partners, arriving in multiple formats, risks overwhelming a commander and staff. Ensuring commanders remain able to make effective decisions in this environment requires effective procedures, trained staff, and appropriate technology. AI, as part of the technology solution, optimised with HQ processes, has the potential to streamline the force generation of a tactical HQ, enhance the situation awareness for commanders by integrating and deconflicting data, and enhancing the planning of future operations. Despite its ability to enhance decision-making, the employment of AI in military systems will always be constrained by the requirement to ensure there is a human in “the loop” for any application of lethal force. Also, given the nature of warfare, the use of any technical system can always be interrupted by an adversaries’ actions or a failure of the technical systems so tactical HQs must always maintain the ability to operate without the support of technology.
