It is always about the people – Martin Luther King Junior
I had the privilege to virtually attend what I believe was the sixth annual DEEP BLUE FORUM conference hosted by VANGUARD recently. These conferences have been focused on all aspects of submarine endeavours. They have enabled an ongoing exchange of perspectives that also educated those like me with neither lived nor learned experience of much value in this sector of military capability.
While I am sure all the conferences in the series have explored all manner of submarine substance, nothing focuses the mind like the decision announced in August 2025 to down-select to two submarine suppliers for the Canadian Patrol Submarine Project (CPSP), targeting 2035 (or sooner, some muse by 2030) for delivery of the first boat.
One of the major topics at the conference was the people challenge. It brought back memories of my involvement in shaping, marketing and implementing the National Shipbuilding Strategy (NSS).
The shaping was done with a handful of capable staff, but to say we covered all the bases well would be an unwarranted exaggeration. The team did the research to define the challenges that successful shipyards would face in terms of skilled blue collar workers – in Canada, the unavailability of many trades was daunting. However, I assumed the shipyards would be able to solve the challenge, based the attraction of a strategic partnership with the potential for 20-plus years of work ahead. I relied on the proverb popularized by the movie ‘Field of Dreams’: “Build it and they will come”. Dreams indeed!
The shipyards did solve the problem, but we soon recognized that many of other Canadian marine suppliers were not so lucky. And my personal opinion is that we saw challenges in hiring shipyard white collar workers. As I left my position with responsibilities in DND for NSS in 2017, a degree of pain was still apparent across Canada.
Interestingly, Australia was launching a similar plan to NSS around 2016. I was invited to brief a visiting delegation on lessons we had learned. I strongly recommended that Australia recruit the people needed with a national program – something they pursued.
As I listened to the DEEP BLUE FORUM panel over 90 minutes tasked to address ‘preparing the people’, it struck me that the CPSP project execution team had a monumental task ahead of them. I doubt the Project Office team is at full strength (equivalent projects pursuing a dozen warships numbered in the 60-100 range in the past), and they will also be navigating the stand-up of the Defence Investment Agency.
I left the conference both excited for the Royal Canadian Navy – and worried. The people challenge faced in the next decade is beyond significant – the NSS issues we faced paled in comparison.
Obvious People Demands
Project Execution Staff: It is well known from observing the implementation issues in progressing weapons systems platform acquisitions as identified in the two most recent Defence Policy Statements that the personnel within the government with the skills and experience to launch and oversee such projects are inadequate. How can the CPSP Project Office be augmented and from where? A recent article by Richard Shimooka in The Hub addresses this issue more broadly.
Crewing the New Submarines
During the conference, it was suggested that a recruiting campaign was needed with a 5% increase every year until 2035. That is about a 60% increase. Nor is the RCN gene pool as large as we might like compared to other navies with 12 submarines, which when CPSP has delivered will put us in the submarine world with those boasting the tenth largest submarine flotillas. And make no mistake, the larger the navy means the larger the capacity and contingency personnel pool. Three approximate benchmarks are interesting, although the vessels and tasks vary significantly – South Korea’s navy all-up is about ten times the personnel strength of the RCN, Germany has twice the RCN number and Turkey is six times the size.
And of course, this requirement goes well beyond manning the submarines with trained submariners, to populating submarine training positions on both coasts (which could at a certain stage could include a fully functional alongside training submarine) and staff billets at all three levels (the two coastal squadrons and formations, and on the Maritime Commander’s HQ staff). Specialized naval support units such as the Maritime Warfare Center will also require trained submariners. And there will also be a desire to fill non-trade specific naval positions throughout the Canadian military enterprise.
Although not an immediate requirement, there may be a need after the initial boats are operational to employ two crews per boat as a retention factor by offering more time ashore. As well, the RCN may choose in time to acquire a submarine rescue vessel with a draw on submariners.
Life Cycle Materiel Management and Technical Authorities
The staff in DND Headquarters tasked with supporting the Upholder Class in terms of in-service maintenance is small. How can this team be expanded into a large and competent directorate, and from where will the personnel come? We must remember that the timeframe is concurrent with preparation for the arrival of the first RIVER Class Destroyer, which regardless of project slippage can be expected to overlap significantly.
Submarine Maintenance
Once 12 boats are in service, submariners trained as technicians will be in demand at flotilla maintenance support units on both coasts, again to ease the pressure on crews once in home ports. Whereas this requirement has been a challenging personnel issue through the years, it will become much more important with 12 submarines in the RCN.
A holistic approach to skills development could require submariners in the Fleet Maintenance Facilities and for periods through Interchange Canada with various in-service support companies. As well during docking work periods, submariners may be needed at shipyards in Quality Assurance Detachment.
Sovereign Supply Chain Industrial Complex
Regardless of which submarine is selected, reliance on the parent country’s submarine supply chains will be risky in both cases, noting the geopolitical potential of conflict in Europe and in the Pacific. While there is domestic industrial support in existence to support the Upholder Class, the new submarines are likely to set out to maximize sovereign supply chains to the maximum extent possible, as signaled at the recent DEEP BLUE FORUM conference. In fact, an in-service support agent is apparently expected to be in place in 2026 or soon after.
This will create a substantial draw on personnel with naval submarine technical experience from wherever possible – the RCN, allied navies and foreign branches of Canadian companies. Security clearances will be a major requirement for all. With a decade (or somewhat less) before the first submarine might be delivered, a core submarine industrial capability should be achievable, enabled by the dedicated efforts of the selected parent submarine provider to qualify companies in Canada – both existing and new – and depending on the incentives that Canada is prepared to pay for. However once again, those with submarine experience could be very challenging to source.
Contingency Pools
There will be many other demands as well. Qualified personnel choose to move elsewhere and others fall very ill – a factor which is of vital importance in crewing submarines but with impacts elsewhere as well. There will be other smaller personnel draws – for example to fill international and recruiting positions and with domestic international standards regulator organization. For all non-Canadians sourced, there will be additional pressure needed on initially on Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada (IRCC) to facilitate and accelerate immigration approvals and foreign worker VISA’s. And as earlier mentioned, securing appropriate security screening and clearances in an expedited manner is required, though rarely achieved.
What to Do
Taking a page out of the NSS lessons learned, I believe that such a challenge is beyond the capabilities of the CPSP execution team, the RCN, the CAF and the Department of National Defence. It requires a national Submarine Generation Program (SGP) with a dedicated recruitment team from multiple agencies in government, in industry associations and with supplemental support under contract.
This program’s staff members need to survey allied nations to better define the recruitment challenge that Canada’s future submarine enterprise faces. And as with all complex projects, sustained and structured collaboration will be essential between the SGP and the CPSP project office, the RCN and Canadian industry.
Also important will be the financial resources available to the SGP to hire top-drawer assistance and to pay for a range of significant benefits to attract interested candidates for all the aforementioned entities with the right experience. I would suggest that the initial budget be set at $100 million, given the potential return on investment and criticality of this function to CPSP success. Successful recruitment for industry could provide capture fees to replenish the SGP’s budget. And consideration should be given to embedding staff in the SGP from government departments to address thorny issues such as those mentioned above regarding immigration/VISA’s and security screening.
It was Douglas Adams who said: “The biggest mistake we make is to underestimate the problem”. The unavailability of people required to enable the success of the future Canadian submarine fleet would be a critical signal point of failure and ranks in my mind as a significant problem. Let’s put the right solution in place and quickly – the clock is ticking.
