Since at least the 1970s there have been several reported sightings of submarines in the Canadian Arctic Archipelago. Unfortunately, there are no instances of one being clearly identified and punished for being submerged in Canadian internal waters without permission. This situation will continue until such a time when we have in place the necessary equipment to monitor the subsurface activity of our internal waters and take appropriate action when necessary. That requirement has received sporadic attention over the years. It is becoming more of a necessity again.
Russia has been increasing its military posture in its arctic region. It has refurbished a number of its Cold War fighter bases, deployed air defence assets, grown its naval assets including nuclear submarines, etc. It has conducted large military exercises. It has resumed long-range bomber flights that come close to the NORAD air defence identification zone. It is developing offensive weapons such as hypersonic cruise missiles and glide vehicles. They are reported to have developed a nuclear-powered, undersea autonomous torpedo and also have a long-range unmanned underwater vehicle (UUV) called Klavesin-2. A nuclear-powered unmanned and underwater drone could potentially map safe routes through the Arctic Archipelago. Although Russia states that the Arctic should be a zone of cooperation its capabilities and actions elsewhere are cause for concern and close monitoring.
China is also becoming increasingly belligerent and aggressive. Although its public policy statements sound reassuring, it cannot be trusted at its word given its repression of democracy in Hong Kong for example. China also ignores international law when it does not suit its purposes as demonstrated by ignoring a decision of the International Court of Justice in favour of the Philippines on matters related to the South China Sea. In the case of our two Michaels, China is not allowing consular access according to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations or even its own China-Canada Consular Agreement. The Chinese Sue Long icebreaker has recently completed a transit of the Northwest Passage. Although China asked permission to transit with the aim of doing scientific research, they may have in fact principally done a reconnaissance of a possible route for their commercial maritime fleet and for their nuclear submarines.
The Northwest Passage, which includes several possible routes, is an option for the strategic movement of naval assets including nuclear submarines from the Arctic Ocean to the Atlantic or vice versa. Given that the various routes through the Arctic Archipelago are not recognized as internal waters of Canada, there exists the possibility that foreign submarines could claim the right of submerged transit without seeking permission because those waters are an international strait that provides the right of transit. This would be a clear challenge to Canada’s sovereignty and security because Canada considers the waters of the Arctic Archipelago as internal waters using the strait baseline method established in 1985. If there was an accident affecting a nuclear-powered submarine in the Arctic Archipelago, the impact on the environment and local communities could be catastrophic. We must therefore be able to identify such activity to discourage any attempts and, if need be, take the appropriate actions to stop them.
Detection under ice is difficult from above. Although long-range patrols carried out by CP-140 Auroras can drop sonobuoys in leads in Arctic Ocean ice, the opportunity is dependent on where the leads are. If a detection was made the pursuit and attack of an intruder under ice would be very difficult if not impossible. Arctic ice requires underwater sensors.
My first exposure to underwater surveillance in the Arctic was as a staff officer involved with defence procurement in 1986. It was one of those projects to fill a deficiency that was part of the White Paper on Defence published in 1987. One of the concerns then was that Soviet submarines could launch ballistic missiles from polynyas in the Arctic Archipelago. Unfortunately, like the nuclear-powered submarines, it was short-lived!
The need for underwater surveillance of the Arctic Archipelago was resuscitated by the Harper Government in 2006. The Defence Research Department Canada (DRDC) was given the task to develop a demonstration project called the Northern Watch Technology Demonstration Project (NWTDP). It was to affirm arctic sovereignty and security. The Project was going to test various surface and subsurface sensors with a focus on subsurface. In accordance with the DRDC June 2016 report,[i] the tests for underwater surveillance were conducted at Gascoyne Inlet, on the southwest corner of Devon Island, Nunavut. Over a period of some 10 years, it has successfully demonstrated the feasibility of installing a sonar array across one of the choke points.
We have made significant arctic domain awareness progress in the last two decades. The most impressive improvement has been the use of RADARSAT I, RADARSAT II, and, presently, the RADARSAT Constellation to conduct surface surveillance from space. Given the size of the Canadian Arctic, especially when you include the Exclusive Economic Zone and eventually the extended continental shelves, surveillance from space is the most cost-effective way of monitoring surface activity in the Arctic. Our fleet of CP-140 Aurora has been recently upgraded and their suite of sensors would be most useful in the detection of surface and sub-surface activity. The North Warning System (NWS), that line of 47 air defence radar sites in the Canadian Arctic is active. Its long-range radars have recently been upgraded and planning for its replacement is ongoing. Many of its sites overlook the Northwest Passage and radar software modifications could include surface surveillance of vessels. The first Arctic Offshore Patrol Ship (AOPS), the HMCS Harry DeWolf, has been commissioned and the second one, HMCS Margaret Brooke, has been delivered to the Royal Canadian Navy. Four others will follow to ensure a physical presence in the Arctic Archipelago during the shipping season. The Inuit Marine Monitoring Program also contributes to surface surveillance of vessels. The missing piece of the puzzle in terms of comprehensive arctic domain awareness is the continuous awareness of underwater activity.
NORAD is in the process of reviewing its infrastructure. It already has a maritime alert warning. Underwater surveillance would be an essential addition to its comprehensive domain awareness of the Arctic. In recent years, successive NORAD Commanders have stated the need for better situational awareness in the Arctic. On 17 August 2021, during a session held at the US Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), General VanHerck, the Commander of NORAD, in the context of arctic domain awareness, twice mentioned the need for underwater data to feed developments with the use of artificial intelligence and machine learning projects designed to increase comprehensive domain awareness and warning time.
Comprehensive underwater surveillance of the complete Arctic Archipelago would be too expensive a program. What is feasible however is the monitoring of the access choke points to trigger a hunt. The DRDC Northern Watch project did recommend a number of choke points on page 44 of its June 2016 report. Even this limited number of surveillance stations would be financially and technically challenging. However, the waters of the Arctic Archipelago are relatively shallow. When combined with the thickness of the ice, the multitude of islands restricting maneuver, and limited bathymetry, the shallow waters of the Arctic Archipelago make it a very dangerous area for submarines to venture into. If detected, a submarine would not be able to use speed or depth to escape. It would therefore be more cost-effective to select a few of the deeper straits to install underwater surveillance equipment. Resolute Bay, where the Northwest passage is only 56 kilometers (30 nautical miles) wide, making surface and subsurface easy, would have to be one of those locations given that many of the options across the Archipelago sail by it. At a minimum, we should monitor the main access points: the Amundsen Gulf and McLure Strait on the western side of the Archipelago, and the entrance of Hudson Strait and Lancaster Sound on the east side. Some of them could be supported for power and communications from North Warning System sites. The information would be provided to the Canadian Joint Operations Command (CJOC), Regional Joint Operations Centre (RJOC), Maritime Security Operations Centre (MSOC), Acoustic Data Analysis Centre (ADAC), and NORAD.
Based on the experience gained by DRDC in the development of Northern Watch it is entirely feasible to deploy sensors combining magnetic, electric field, and acoustic sensors to monitor the choke points from remotely controlled stations. Underwater unmanned vehicles such as ISE Explorer could be installed in the summer and perform surveillance using seafloor nodes where data transfer and regular charging can take place[i]. This approach could overcome the challenges of the shoreline movements of sea ice and the scouring of the seabed by icebergs. Those systems are improving year after year in terms of their range, navigation, and communication systems.
Canada is often criticized for not doing enough to protect its own sovereignty. It was so again recently in a Modern War Institute article[i]. At the moment, there is no project listed in the Defence Capabilities Blueprint to deal with monitoring submerged submarines or underwater unmanned vehicles in the Arctic Archipelago. As a sovereign nation, we have the duty to know what is going on in our own backyard. Canada needs to change that!
[1] https://cradpdf.drdc-rddc.gc.ca/PDFS/unc253/p804761_A1b.pdf
[1] https://ise.bc.ca/product/surveillance/
[1] https://mwi.usma.edu/canadas-arctic-problem/
Pierre provides independent advice on Arctic security and sovereignty matters. He was the Commander of the now Joint Task Force North for five years. He spent more than nine years in the Arctic where he travelled extensively including Alaska and Greenland. He has been an advocate for improved security in the Arctic since 1998. Pierre has also provided several defence related companies with support in their pursuit of arctic opportunities. He has published several articles on arctic security and sovereignty. Learn more http://www.arcticsecurity.ca/.
