In a recent article in Foreign Affairs, U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates predicted that most lethal threats to the U.S. would likely “emanate from states that cannot adequately govern themselves or secure their own territory.”
Fractured and failing states, he wrote, present a complex problem not just to militaries, but also to the institution of government: “[I]t’s the main security challenge of our time.” We may not soon see a repeat of missions on the scale of Iraq or Afghanistan, but the toolkit required for future interventions will be of a similar nature.
One means for solving such complex problems is a concept gaining traction among western governments: the comprehensive approach (CA). The underlying philosophy is not new – its roots can be traced back to the Marshall Plan, the reconstitution of Japan, and the Malayan Emergency, and elements of CA can be found in counterinsurgency and civil-military doctrine – but the need for greater collaboration in operations is prompting nations to re-evaluate how the concept might be institutionalized.
Last month in Kingston, the Queen’s Centre for International Relations in partnership with the Directorate of Land Concepts and Designs, the Chief of Force Development and the Defence and Security Institute brought together academics, NGOs, military and representatives from other government departments for a two-day conference on Canadian perspectives on the comprehensive approach.
What emerged from the discussion is a concept that, although nascent in its implementation, is starting to change the operational structure of government departments. The event was held under the Chatham House rule, so participants cannot be identified.
The security and development nexus is at the heart of CA, and on the surface it sounds simple and obvious: integrate the work of various players in conflict zones, both at national and international levels, to achieve a coordinated, collaborative and more effective outcome.
In practice, it has been a challenge. Past experience with a so-called 3D approach – defence, development and diplomacy – provided some valuable lessons but never reached the level of integration now being sought. As one participant noted, the recent arrival in Afghanistan of an American commander with his equal civilian counterpart “[is] leaps and bounds” from previous missions in the Balkans.
Action plans, guidelines and discussion papers have been accumulating in NATO, the United Nations, and in western capitols for some time, but efforts to integrate the roles of the various players – military, diplomats and aid agencies, to name just some – are “still largely sporadic” due to the lack of a long-term effort to institutionalize coordinating mechanisms.
Experience is also showing that without strong leadership from the top, little progress should be expected. As one former deputy commander of Joint Task Force Afghanistan explained, a plan that took four months to create did not survive half as long in theatre because it did not have the buy-in of senior government leadership; a second attempt with wide departmental backing received Cabinet approval in 25 days. “The comprehensive approach does work but [it] can’t be driven by people who think their priorities top others,” the commander said. And while a plan will play out in theatre, the buy-in “has to start at home.”
That hinges on having a shared vision of the nature of the conflict and, increasingly, a common language. The military lexicon tends to dominate. What, for example, do the counterinsurgency phases of shape, clear, hold and build mean for diplomats and aid agencies. Who defines “effects” and “timelines”?
The growing demand for specialized civilian expertise in conflict zones has meant some noticeably changes – including the ability for rapid deployment – in civilian organizations. Originally conceived as a provider of strategic policy, programming and funding, the Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (START) within DFAIT has begun to develop “operational agility.” Approximately a third of its 65 employees are deployable. Following the recent earthquake in Haiti, START had an assessment team on the ground within 20 hours. CIDA has seen a similar shift in emphasis: from one representative in Kandahar in 2006, the agency now has a dozen operating in the country.
One of most contentious aspects of CA remains the relationship with nongovernmental organizations, many of which require neutrality in order to function. Again, language plays an important part: the use of terms like “force multiplier” has hindered their ability to share the same space with militaries.
Defence researchers have been investigating a range of CA aspects and may in time help define some of the best practices for militaries and civilians. But many participants acknowledged that joint training would go a long way to improving cooperation – too much of in-theatre success remains personality dependent.
Though Canada’s pending military withdrawal from Afghanistan has some concerned that the limited institutional gains of recent years could dissipate, it appears likely that CA will continue to evolve across the international community as standards and best practices find footing. To quote one participant: “I think a lot of what we’re doing is lining up the ducks.”
