The recent comments regarding Canada becoming the 51st state are exacerbated by the fact that there is no single Office of Primary Interest (OPI) for Canadian sovereignty. Sovereignty represents “supreme authority within a territory.”1 For sovereignty to be exercised, two elements must be present: authority and territory. A state may perceive that it has authority over territory but can be said to exert sovereignty over that region only if it has uncontested authority over that territory. Currently, the Northern regions of Canada are unable to be surveilled (other than by satellite when available). This creates a sovereignty void. The Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) would seem to be the logical choice for a single OPI to help fill that void in the expression of Canadian sovereignty but there are many other “fingers” in the Canadian “sovereignty pie”. A veritable alphabet soup of federal government departments has a stake in Canadian sovereignty, especially in the North. See below for many of these federal government stakeholders:
Figure 1 – Federal Government Departments with a Stake in Canadian Sovereignty
This does not include the numerous provincial, territorial, indigenous, and municipal governments that all have a stake in maintaining Canadian sovereignty, especially in Canada’s north.
As for the CAF’s role in maintaining Canadian sovereignty is concerned, there are some wide gaps. This was demonstrated in 2023 with the Chinese spy balloon that flew through Canadian airspace and was only detected after it crossed into the continental United States from British Columbia and was subsequently shot down by the Americans. This balloon had travelled undetected through Alaska, the Yukon, and most of British Columbia before finally being detected near the BC/USA border. It followed the path detailed in the Figure 2 below.
Figure 2 – January 2023 Chinese Spy Balloon Path3
The reason cited by MGen Paul Prevost (Director of Staff, Strategic Joint Staff) for the late detection of this balloon that had travelled thousands of kilometres over both American and Canadian territory, was: “there was no “infrastructure of significance” along the balloon’s flight path.”
Although the infrastructure in Canada’s north is limited, an investment in airships that would regularly conduct sustainment activities in the shared Canadian and American Northern regions could be leveraged to detect foreign incursions into our airspace; it could be used to deliver cargo, improving the Quality of Life (QoL) for local populations; and it could also provide a deployable expeditionary Humanitarian Aid and Disaster Relief (HA/DR) capability. HA/DR events will likely only increase in frequency as climate change progresses.
Interest from the mining industry has also been generated in leveraging existing airship transportation infrastructure to unlock parts of the resource-rich Canadian wilderness that contain minerals that have been deemed critical to de-carbonizing Canada’s economy . In a recent trade publication published by The Association of Ontario Land Economists, it’s been noted:
“[w]hen the mining industry adopts a hydrogen airship model of operations, they will be able to access the most valuable minerals wherever they are in the most environmentally sound way. Most of environmental disruption of mining operations is caused by roads which will no longer be needed.
Mining operations in areas where no roads currently exist would be a good way to start developing “infrastructure of significance” in the area.
My colleague, Dr. Barry Prentice and I have written extensively on a concept for a circuit of airships that could transit Canada’s Northernmost regions. In a conference paper presented at the Canadian Transportation Research Forum, we point out that one airship, based out of Hay River, could effectively transit the entire Arctic region over a 24-hour period see Figure 3.
Figure 3 – Potential Airship Reach Within 12/24 hrs from Hay River – One Airship8
The situation when a second airship is added based out of Moosonee and a third is added operating out of Iqaluit is seen in Figure 4.
Figure 4 – Potential Airship Reach Within 12/24 hrs from Hay River – One Airship8
Having three airships transiting the region significantly improves the visibility of the Northernmost regions of Canada. When there is no demand for cargo shipping, the three airships could effectively patrol the region and, if equipped with similar sensors as are currently used on the Royal Canadian Air Force’s (RCAF) CP-140 Aurora – Maritime Patrol Aircraft, the gap in our Northernmost regions where there is “no infrastructure of significance” suddenly becomes smaller and transiting vehicles (sea or air) would become much more visible to the Canadian Armed Forces and its allies.
To take responsibility and exert sovereignty over its Northern regions, the Canadian Government needs to start investing in this technology. The circuit proposed in this article could effectively dissuade other national entities from conducting activities in our region that we’re not aware of. Chinese and Russian interest in the region is already increasing which is raising tensions in the Arctic. A circuit of between one and three airships used to deliver cargo for CAF operations and to communities in the area could be employed in a multi-role capacity to also conduct surveillance and increase visibility. Ultimately sovereignty represents “supreme authority within a territory.” For sovereignty to be exercised, two elements must be present: authority and territory. This becomes particularly pertinent to Canada’s claim of sovereignty over the Arctic. If the Canadian government is unable (or less able) to exercise authority over the activities in the region than another party, it no longer can claim to have sovereignty over that region. As discussed in this paper, Airships could help in the expression of Canadian sovereignty which could disrupt or even terminate any future discussions about it becoming the 51st state. Not only that, but this investment could go a long way to improving the quality of life of local inhabitants by reducing the cost of living as well as opening the vast mineral wealth that Canada has to the rest of the world.
References:
1. Canada. Statistics Canada, The Canadian Transportation System Ottawa: Transportation Data and Information Hub, 2018.
2. Canada. Critical Minerals Centre of Excellence, Canada’s critical minerals Ottawa: Critical minerals in Canada, 2025. Available at: https://www.canada.ca/en/campaign/critical-minerals-in-canada/critical-minerals-an-opportunity-for-canada.html (accessed: 16 Jan 2025).
3. D’Andrea A. (2023) “We now know the path the Chinese spy balloon took over Canada”, Global News. Posted 17 February 2023. Available at: https://globalnews.ca/news/9494290/chinese-spy-balloon-flight-path-canada/ (accessed: 16 Jan 2025).
4. Ibrahim, A. (2024) “The Arctic Geopolitics: Melting Ice and Rising Tensions”, Modern Diplomacy, Posted 23 November 2024. Available at: https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2024/11/23/the-arctic-geopolitics-melting-ice-and-rising-tensions/ (accessed: 16 Jan 2025).
5. O’Dwyer, M. (2024) “More on Northern Access: Airships and the (Possible) Rise of Nanotubes”, The Land Economist. vol. 54 no. 2.
6. Prentice, B. and Normand N. (2023) “Airships Logistics Circuit for Arctic Security and Resupply”, Conference Paper Presented at the 58th Canadian Transportation Research Forum. Presented: 10 May 2023.
7. Prentice, B. and Normand, N. (2024) “Airships for the Arctic”, Canadian Defence Review. vol. 30 issue 1 (pp. 60-69) .
8. Zalta, Edward N. “Sovereignty”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2020 Edition): accessed 8 March 2021, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/sovereignty/.
