History shows that change has always come as a result of irresistible pressure from events or leaders.
In certain cases, the pressure came from events: the fall of the Soviet empire and the Warsaw Pact in 1989 dissolved the initial raison-d’être of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and forced the Alliance to look for a role. NATO continues to change to this day.
The deficit pressures on the Canadian government and the search for efficiencies in the Department of National Defence (DND) in the early 1990s led to Programme Review, the relocation of the three environmental headquarters to Ottawa, the Management, Re-engineering Command and Control Team (MCCRT), and many other initiatives. At the same time, private industry was also going through significant change as a result of the same resource and efficiency pressures; remember the terms “change management,” “re-engineering,” and “continuous improvement.” Hundreds of books and articles were being written on different approaches that were sure to improve efficiency. Concepts from Japan and Europe were being touted in North America as the way of the future.
The turn of the millennium in 2000 was an event that created an entire set of “business continuity” and “workaround” professionals and companies that made millions of dollars preparing private and public institutions for Y2K. At DND, the approach was to set up a team led by the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff to plan for the aftermath of Y2K (this was a case when the Canadian Forces could not afford to “under-plan.” If nothing happened, the CF might have been criticized for spending a lot of resources planning and preparing, but if a calamity happened and insufficient means had been devoted to the plans and preparations, the blame would have been handed out to all); eventually, 1st Canadian Division headquarters deployed to Ottawa from Kingston to manage the changeover at midnight on 31 December 1999. In any case, Y2K itself forced organizations to consider and develop plans to continue operating in the event of total IT malfunctions.
The catastrophe that was September 11, 2001 forced change, especially, but not only within security organizations. Terrorists engendered a global change in transport protocols, in information handling, in border regulations, etc. If their aim was to force the world to spend scarce resources on new security arrangements, they achieved it.
In other cases in Canada’s history, change was the result of pressure from an irresistible leader. Former Minister of National Defence Paul Hellyer was one of those leaders. Whether he was right or wrong, he had the conviction of his ideas and would suffer no detractions from his plan to “reform” the services and the administration of the military in the 1960s.
Similarly, former Chief of the Defence Staff General Rick Hillier was an unstoppable leader who convinced his political masters that the CF needed to change the way it planned and carried out operations. This led to a major change in the way the CF was organized, trained and equipped. Over three years, Hillier fought naysayers and obstructionists of his plan. He expended enormous amounts of energy developing his ideas, creating a cadre of supportive subordinates who would manage the change for him, and getting the message out to superiors, subordinates and the public. The most visible of these changes was the very rapid stand-up of the four operational headquarters. For all his energy, three years of constantly breaking down doors tired out Hillier and he was content to hold the change there and retire having accomplished more than many of his predecessors.
Change management becomes transformation
The difference between change in the 1990s and change today is significant. In the ‘90s, change was a reactive activity, a response to events or leadership pressures. It was seen as negative and temporary, leading to an end-state. So normally, organizations would set up temporary “change management” teams that would react and manage the change until the end state was reached, then would be disbanded (e.g., in DND, the MCCRT, Red Tape Action Team, Y2K Action Team, etc).
Today, there is a realization that change can be good; that it is not temporary, but a permanent and positive action (not reaction); that it need not always be forced from outside pressures; and that it requires not temporary “change management” offices, but permanent line organizations to not only react, but promote change. This is what the overused word “transformation” means: a cyclical, permanent process of positive change that enables organizations and individuals to anticipate and shape the future. So all significant organizations, private and public, should set up an “Office of Transformation” at the highest level that thinks about, promotes and, if necessary, forces change. If the Office of Transformation is internal to the institution, its Chief will need the authority of the Commander to implement change.
NATO created Allied Command Transformation (ACT) in 2003 with this exact mandate of promoting and managing change. When the strategic command was created, its Commanders and staff saw themselves as “forcing agents” for change and questioned everything. After more than 50 years and enormous change in the geopolitical situation, it was time for NATO to evolve.
ACT rapidly realized that one of the things that has not changed is the reaction to change or transformation. Most people thrive on routine. Change forces people out of their comfort zone. So the usual reaction will be negative and uncooperative. The solution is to communicate and to be completely honest in justifying the need.
The reaction to change has amazing elastic properties. Hellyer disestablished the Royal Canadian Navy, the Canadian Army and the Royal Canadian Air Force; he started calling “Admirals” “Generals”, and put all services in green uniforms. He had to deal with a mini-revolt. After he had left, it was realized in 1974 that there was no longer one officer responsible for all air forces. Air Command was thus created, bringing the CF back to three “services” in anything but name. Today, the elastic properties of the reaction have brought back admirals, three distinct environmental uniforms and de facto commanders of the navy, army and air force. Perhaps the pendulum had swung too far…?
Re-energizing transformation
Today, we need to continue the change process begun by Hillier; this is why the appointment of Lieutenant-General Andrew Leslie as Chief of Transformation is a very good thing.
There is much to be happy about; in the absence of a catalyst event, and given the proper authority, Leslie is well suited to be the new unstoppable leader of transformation. He is the most senior of the three-leaf generals and admirals still serving. The CDS ought to provide him with all necessary authorities to – without regard to colour of uniform – implement necessary change in the CF. Leslie is also extremely intelligent, strategic and erudite, and has lived the Hillier era as a two-leaf general, then as Chief of the Land Staff (Army Commander). He is an excellent communicator and will require this skill in his new job. He has had four years at the helm of the Land Forces, which have progressed significantly in their own transformation. Now he gets to work on the CF as a whole in a period of post-Afghanistan operational pause.
He should concentrate inter alia on issues of jointness, interoperability (with allies and with non-military agencies), force generation versus force employment, the need (or not) for three-leaf environmental chiefs, command of forces in the Canadian Joint Task Force geographical areas, and the development of efficient management processes in Ottawa. The “Chief of Transformation” should also become a permanent position within the CF, vested with the authority of the CDS.
To this day, there are many who promote the idea of a return to separate Canadian Forces and departmental HQs and to three services. The military will make anything work; but questions need to be asked: Is the coordination of our operations better now than it was in the days of the DCDS? Have we achieved the necessary efficiency in the operational commands? Do we still need three environmental commanders at three-leaf level? Who should own the forces in Canada? All are issues for the Chief of Transformation.
Andrew Leslie has a full plate but he is well-positioned and well-qualified to make a definite impact, providing he is given the authority and the tools to do so.
LGen (Ret’d) J.O. Michel Maisonneuve is Academic Director of the Royal Military College Saint-Jean, a former Chief of Staff of NATO’s Allied Command Transformation, and a member Vanguard’s editorial advisory board.