We determine our destination by our priorities – Keith K. Hilbig
Anyone who has ever played poker knows that a royal flush is always the winning hand, with the five highest cards in one of the four suits: the Ace, King, Queen, Jack and Ten. What does that have to do with complex weapon systems platform acquisitions?
Card games are all about emergence, which is defined as “the process of becoming exposed after being invisible.”
Complex project definitions all identify a high level of interconnections creating significant unpredictability and emergent risks, until they become visible. As one sets out to acquire uniquely designed or modified weapon systems platforms – or to enter the production of same – the project life cycle stretches into many years, further increasing almost exponentially the number of emergent risks.
When facing anything likely to introduce many unpredictable issues, the desire is to “hold all the cards”, borrowing a common comment by the President of the USA.
In complex platform acquisitions, those involved should be best prepared for complex platform acquisitions by holding an excellent hand before they start – a royal flush. Having spent a decade between 2007 and 2017 with a portfolio of weapon system platform acquisition projects for the Royal Canadian Navy and the Canadian Army, I have some insight into the requirements to navigate the emergent risks of such projects – what I consider to be the equivalent to a royal flush.
It is useful to qualify this note before launch:
- Much is in flux regarding Canada’s National Defence agenda which could cause some to consider this note as OBE: the Prime Minister’s expectation of incorporating artificial intelligence to achieve efficiency in all organizations; the significant plus-up in funding; Canada’s first Defence Industrial Strategy; and the creation of the Defence Investment Agency responsible for procurement reform, the execution of selected acquisitions over $100 million, and implementing the Defence Industrial Strategy with assistance from eight government entities.
- Having observed global platform acquisitions not off assembly lines, I firmly believe that no matter how good any organization is when acquiring warships, fighter jets and combat vehicles, there is no certainty regarding outcomes. The best anyone can hope for in progressing these projects is to reduce the harm from major risks to desired project outcomes.
My ‘Ace’
My tenure taught me what most practitioners know, that expectation management is absolutely critical when pursuing complex endeavours.
When I was involved with the creation of the National Shipbuilding Strategy (NSS) in the period 2008-2012, I failed expectation management based on assumptions:
- I assumed that everyone, including Ministers, understood that shipbuilders never worked in a shipyard that guaranteed steady employment for a career, because the work flow was interrupted between classes of ships, and often between the first uniquely designed ship and follow-on ships. I was wrong; our Ministers offered a guarantee of uninterrupted employment, that expectation creating challenges for Canada.
- I assumed everyone knew that after the NSS was in place, it would take a decade or more before the first ship would be delivered. I was wrong, as the public expected finished ships to appear within 2-3 years.
- I assumed that the public would know announcements of project costs would be weak estimates until the requirements had been nailed down by the operators, the ship had been designed and the first ship had been built. I was wrong, and a lack of allowed transparency to build the right expectation was never possible.
The result was great disappointment broadly in government and with the public. Somehow, the NSS has survived when government changed. But the lesson is clear. One must set clear expectations at project launch and monitor the context continuously, to enable resetting them throughout the project with periodic briefings to the public.
Such transparency regarding expectations was on display in a video entitled “Forward Guidance” posted by Prime Minister Carney on April 19, 2026, where he broadly specifically set expectations: “I promise you, I will never sugarcoat our challenges. Instead, I will talk with you, directly and regularly, about our plans, why we are doing what we are doing, what’s working and what isn’t, and what we are going to do next… and there will be setbacks along the way.” Such a commitment to transparency and expectation management is essential for complex platform acquisition projects.
My ‘King’
My king has always been schedule management. I had opined this regularly throughout my career, thinking others did not understand this. I was to learn that while some did, many did not.
The initial intent with NSS was to provide a number of classes of government ship classes to two shipyards, to build sequentially. What we soon saw was what we all know from our daily lives. If you get behind at breakfast, you likely will never catch up on other planned tasks for the day, because the delays compound resulting in some tasks being pushed into the next day.
Under NSS, when the first ships to be built in new facilities with new processes and a recently scaled-up work force were late, all the follow on ship programs were rendered late. And as per the well known adage, time is money. Not only did replacement ships not arrive when expected, causing money to be spent to maintain the older vessels in-service, so too were all the follow-on ships delayed and more costly. The slippage of years introduced inflation across the board. In other words, when schedule compliance could not be managed, costs went up as well. I maintain that schedule performance is the largest indicator of delivery on or over budget.
Also important are all those emerging risks, which invariably result in delays to the work plan. If on the critical path, they introduce delays, but it takes time to assess risks and their impacts.
Three final points: you must start projects very early, as time lost before contract award can never be recovered; once in contract, you might make up for some lost time but never all of it; and the Prime must employ a detailed and daily updated master schedule across the entire project enterprise, the key to success during the Canadian Patrol Frigate modernization program.
My ‘Queen’
After schedule, my experience is that influential stakeholders with important interests at play in weapon system platform acquisitions often create the largest challenge to project success.
During my tenure, I witnessed a Minister’s staff member delay a project with a non-viable approach for well over a year. In other cases, Assistant Deputy Ministers created issues that delayed projects for many years. And disagreements between company CEOs were problematic in a contract I was involved in. These delays cost millions of dollars in the aggregate and set up projects for late delivery.
Stakeholder management is a common system employed by senior project execution and governance staff, to develop ongoing stakeholder intelligence regarding current and shifting stakeholder perspectives during project journeys. Project context changes have an impact on influential stakeholders, and personalities with an interest and a bullhorn. As I have explained in previous notes, managing these transitions requires a response and deft approach. The intent is to maintain alignment with project goals and plans, or to alternatively realign the project where it makes sense.
My ‘Jack’
The practice of project management is in many respects a Jack of all trades. The basics have been well understood for decades, as is well explained by the Project Management Institute’s Body of Knowledge (PMBoK). For me, it implicates both the client’s project execution team and the project’s governance members. They comprise the integration brain for the entire project enterprise, and it is itself integrated with the implementing supplier’s project management team after contract award.
Governance deserves special mention. It sets the risk culture, the methods of oversight, the essential leadership support to the project staff, and the important support ecosystem to all such complex projects that should be doing the heavy lifting to allow projects to be positioned for maximum success.
It becomes much more challenging in virtually all aspects of advancing complex projects. Over the past decade, many emerging techniques and attributes have been defined to better navigate complex projects such as weapon systems platform acquisitions. Aside from stakeholder management, these include such approaches as advanced risk treatment, systems thinking, wave planning and structured collaboration. The International Centre for Complex Project Management is an excellent resource in such matters.
What has become clearer in recent years is that the most important indicator of success is the project execution team’s experience and skills in such complex environments, and it being in place at the earliest stage of the launch of these projects. It is always about the people, but with complex projects it is that attribute on steroids.
‘My Ten’
The statement of user requirements is the last of the five.
Over specifying regularly takes too much time, leads to hundreds of mandatory demands and in essence creates a straitjacket for suppliers post contract award by leaving little room for trade-offs and design innovation.
What is needed is a strong focus on the handful of high level mandatory requirements that define a minimum viable product, each requirement’s return on investment analyzed as appropriate to inform prioritization, and inclusion of jettison and fitted-for-but-not-with lists – the latter developed by the senior user’s representative as the one shouldering the related significant risks which the rank and file are not paid to address.
My Point
My royal flush can set complex platform acquisition projects on a road towards maximizing desired outcomes. And these are on top of the well established ‘best practices’ connected to managing less complex projects.
That said, Stephen Covey reminds us that “priority is a function of context”, so your Royal Flush may differ from mine. Nevertheless, I recommend it for consideration by government and defence contractors alike when engaged in weapon systems platform acquisition projects.