In August 2008 when I was given the task of developing what would soon become the National Shipbuilding Procurement Strategy (NSPS), we were reacting to procurement challenges with the Joint Support Ship (JSS) acquisition project.
The NSPS—now rebranded as the National Shipbuilding Strategy (NSS)—was driven by the need to replace multiple Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) vessels beyond the Joint Support Ships, including the Arctic Offshore Patrol Vessels and the Canadian Patrol Frigates. As well, the Canadian Coast Guard had a significant number of scientific and icebreaking vessels that were required but had experienced procurement challenges with its HERO class. It was clear to the PMO and PCO that we needed a better way to acquire the government’s large and complex ships.
Since the signing of NSS umbrella agreements signaled the NSS’s launch in earnest in February 2012, the initial two shipyards have been on steep modernization and learning curves in a progressively less peaceful environment. With the recent addition of the third NSS shipyard, all three have full order books with no apparent additional capacity for a decade or more.
Concurrently, the geopolitical stability of 2008 has dramatically deteriorated. Instead of the five-day Russian invasion and war in Georgia that we saw in August 2008, we are approaching the fourth anniversary of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. As reported in Semafor on December 18, 2025, Russian president Putin again pledged to liberate Russia’s historic lands, adding that “the European swine backing Ukraine would eventually give up.”
The RCN has been moving to expand its fleet as quickly as possible with new submarines and ongoing considerations for a continental defence corvette class. But with the three NSS shipyards booked to deliver other necessary government vessels, Canada will likely have to go offshore — as is intended for 12 new submarines — or employ other existing shipyards in Canada.
Essentially, our nation appears to be coming to grips with the need to move to a wartime footing and with an increased priority in the Arctic. In terms of the RCN, this is best addressed by NSS 2.0 as a program for additional new capabilities. It is already preparing for a significant enhancement of support capabilities as it contemplates the future fleet of submarines.
This short note raises some of the questions that a NSS 2.0 program should consider in terms of the top-of-mind options and related issues to enable the RCN to achieve a wartime footing. This article does not address the equally essential supply chain issues such as super-security and extensive warehousing of stockpiled munitions and spare parts — sovereignty on steroids.
Strengths and weaknesses
The good news is that we are not starting with a blank sheet of paper in terms of strengths:
• We are more than a decade into the journey of recreating Canada’s shipbuilding capabilities and cooperative relationships, as well as reinforcing the marine systems and services clusters that support construction activity. These shipyards could also leverage ship design companies to start developing concept design options for future ship aspirations.
• We have a strong set of defence industries in Canada with respect to sensors and combat management systems.
• There are many other, less capable shipyards in Canada whose current condition and potential for growth would likely require assessment.
• A Defence Investment Agency (DIA) is being created to improve procurement practices while tackling military platform acquisition projects, with the behemoths being warships. In support is a complementary defence industrial strategy that may have been announced as one reads this note.
• The minister of national defence has publicly stated that there is interest from many nations to collaborate with Canada.
Of course, there are also some less robust maritime elements:
• Challenges remain with the timely delivery of River Class destroyers and icebreakers for the Coast Guard.
• While we appear to have the shipbuilding workforce to get the NSS order books delivered in the coming years, there doesn’t seem to be a large pipeline of skilled personnel behind them. The smaller shipyards may also remain short of competent blue-collar builders. Resolving the personnel challenges of ramping up other shipyards is presently an unknown.
• Nor is the government’s workforce able to easily take on new studies, assess non-NSS shipyards and other suppliers’ capabilities, and initiate more shipbuilding projects. This situation is further exacerbated by a degree of turbulence as the DIA finds its footing and the government downsizes.
• While reliance in the past on U.S. shipbuilding expertise was useful, it might no longer be expected with confidence.
• Based on the speed of technological advancements, the original two NSS shipyards may need immediate and ongoing investment in facilities and equipment; it has already been almost 15 years since they identified the equipment needed to bid on shipyard modernization under NSPS. Facility expansion (on the same site or nearby) may also be worth considering.
• Other nations are rearming and may be exhausting their maritime industries, leaving minimal support available for Canada to tap into.
The possibilities and requirements
Ideally, the RCN would have a broader range of assets – many more than two JSS, Arctic-capable mobile repair platforms, an Arctic-capable amphibious landing craft (as Vice-Admiral Topshee has mentioned recently) and minehunters. This also includes Arctic-capable autonomous uncrewed capabilities in significant numbers, which admittedly is an arena that the RCN has been studying and recently launched contractually with MDA for an Uncrewed Aircraft System.
For big, crewed ships, it may be necessary to disrupt planning at Seaspan’s shipyard in Vancouver to build additional JSS. Furthermore, experience with the JSS and the Polar Icebreaker might support an Arctic-capable amphibious landing craft. It should also be possible to leverage selected shipbuilding companies outside NSS to construct and deliver blocks for Arctic-capable corvettes and mobile repair ships, minehunters and perhaps even further batches of River Class Destroyers. It is important to note that multi-yard block construction carries its own risks. Strong leadership at one or more final assembly shipyards will be critical, along with realistic expectations during the early phases as learning curves are addressed.
The advantages of autonomous vessels are well understood. In his recent article in Australia’s The Strategist, Jason Van der Schyff made the following points:
• “The next wave of defence capability can be realized by … unlocking the industrial depth that already exists across Australia’s recreational, commercial and civil maritime sectors.”
• Regarding autonomous vessels for the Royal Australian Navy, he noted that “The right design is closer to a truck than a warship … cheap enough to lose, flexible enough to upgrade and sturdy enough to operate without bespoke support.”
As in Australia, Canada has companies building a wide range of vessels and smaller aircraft that could provide a distributed industrial base. This capacity could be leveraged to generate a fleet of uncrewed vessels—operating on, over, and under the seas—at scale as part of an evolved National Shipbuilding Strategy 2.0. There are plenty of designs available that we might build with Canadian sensor and data communication technologies.
Not insignificant will be the impact that this level of growth in shipbuilding has on the capacity and capabilities of a wide range of Royal Canadian Navy organizations. These include Naval Engineering and Test Establishment (NETE); Defence Research and Development Canada’s Atlantic Research Centre; the Canadian Forces Maritime Warfare Centre; naval intelligence at Trinity; ammunition depots on both coasts; Sea Training establishments east and west; and Bases Halifax and Esquimalt, including jetties, maintenance and logistics facilities, syncrolifts, docking infrastructure, and port defences.
This expansion may also extend to supporting new home ports on each coast for fleets of larger autonomous uncrewed vessels, enhanced Arctic support at Nanisivik and potentially elsewhere in the North, and increased demands on Ottawa-based organizations delivering maritime capability—namely Maritime Equipment Program Management (DGMEPM), potentially augmented by a contracted Level Zero Life Cycle Material Management function, and the Major Projects Delivery division (DGMPD-Sea), which is expected to transition to DIA.
The magnitude of this skilled personnel growth challenge must not be underestimated.
As well, the Coast Guard’s capabilities in support of the RCN need to be reconsidered in the broadest sense, including uncrewed vessels. If we are serious about achieving a wartime footing, every vessel in the government’s fleet should be considered for the potential to contribute to the Navy’s continental defence missions through upgraded capabilities.
Preparing for future vulnerabilities
A wartime footing in today’s disruptive technological environment demands that potentially significant vulnerabilities must also be explored. Some of the more challenging include:
• scaled-up weapon-carrying drone attacks by the thousands;
• satellite-generated energy beam weapons;
• the complete loss of satellite support for months;
• a scientific breakthrough that turns the oceans transparent;
• attacks generated with the aid of AI and quantum computing;
• electromagnetic pulse impacts;
• artificially generated and pinpointed tsunamis or violent storms; and
• multiples of the above concurrently.
Who and how?
Ideas and policies are great, but there are three questions that the RCN, think-tanks and conferences need to grapple with: how do we tackle NSS 2.0, what in the long list of desirable new capabilities are the priorities, and where do we find the people to hire who can enable the launch and continuous delivery of new RCN vessels and capabilities?
The current government has promised much bigger budgets for the Canadian Armed Forces. To accelerate platform acquisition projects under the DIA, they have mused about reducing rules and processes and accepting greater risk.
All of this will be supported by an enhanced domestic defense industrial complex. These are essential enablers of NSS 2.0.
Expectations matter. Some people have suggested that the DIA will require endless sprints. Perhaps a more realistic metaphor for a wartime footing might be continuous New York City Self-Transcendence 3,100-mile foot races, with sprints required frequently along the way–and this pace needs to permeate all efforts forthwith.
The time is now to develop the NSS 2.0 strategy and plan that will allow those involved to ‘proceed with all due dispatch’. Nothing less will prepare us to face a no-fail set of missions to equip and maintain a significantly enhanced RCN.
I sincerely hope our naval enterprise is way ahead of me.