I didn’t set a red line, the world set a red line – Barack Obama
Recently, there have been many events and articles focused on Canada’s identity issues. I specifically found Michel Maisonneuve (LGen Retd) appearance in the Macdonald-Laurier Institute series on ’Voices That Inspire’ very interesting.
One theme that resonated with me was the retired General’s mention of Canada’s tolerance. I was reminded of that well-known quote by Ralph Waldo Emerson: ‘our strengths are a hair’s breadth away from becoming our weaknesses’.
Another thread came from an article by David Moscrop in The Walrus, where he spoke about the ongoing challenges in dealing with the US Administration and concluded that “Canada must nonetheless have its red lines, and push back firmly against American aggression…”
I concluded that many Canadians feel Canada needs a makeover, and that in doing so we need to walk back tolerance a bit and introduce red lines. My personal feeling is that we must recreate and protect an overriding value of contributing to the common good, one that was baked into my worldview as a child and was raised by the General as ‘service’ to others.
What Is the Link to Complex Acquisition Projects?
Over three decades in Canada’s navy, service and red lines were very much a part of everyday life. In a subsequent decade as a public servant responsible for a portfolio of platform acquisition projects, the job was still about serving others but the unwritten red line was not to rock the boat. In spite of the many ways we were perceived as failing to deliver complex weapons systems platform procurement projects, it was very much my sense that we were not working towards the common good – of the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF), of the government of Canada and of our citizens.
Under the new government of Prime Minister Mark Carney, change is being demanded for the common good in terms of insurance against geopolitical threats. Essentially, the goal is to ‘remake’ our military procurement system of capabilities such as major platform acquisition projects for the CAF. Funding has increased with more promised in the future. A Defence Investment Agency (DIA) has been created and assigned its first group of such projects. A comprehensive Defence Industrial Strategy is promised within weeks. As well, we are led to believe that the new system will have fewer rules (so more flexibility) and take more risks (as opposed to avoiding them and assigning them to industry) to increase the speed of delivery.
What I have yet to see are the red lines relating to these intended changes, hence this note. For clarity, a red line is defined as a limit beyond which someone’s behaviour (or an organization’s) is not acceptable.
As the DIA is stood up, it seems appropriate that the DIA CEO would define the new agency’s red lines. Were I him, I would be setting red lines in a number of areas of concern – many of which I have captured in many articles and papers as suggested improvements. This article highlights possible red lines for his consideration.
And in keeping with the quote from President Obama, the red lines I have included are drawn from the world – this time the world of complex project management.
DIA Stand-Up
Results are always about the people. A red line regarding the personnel selected for DIA would be the avoidance of weak contributors that could jeopardize the daily urgency imperative. Every member of the DIA must have ‘the right stuff’’.
Associations such as the International Center for Complex Project Management and the World Commerce and Contracting Association can be pursued to define the ‘right stuff’ in terms of capabilities. Also opportunistic, both the United Kingdom and Australia have recently created related professions within their governments and might also offer useful perspectives. But my personal red line here is that those who do not possess an open worldview should not apply.
In terms of DIA leadership, the red line must be drawn to exclude those without significant lived and learned experience for the positions involved. In addition, any team leader who does not have a full-time deputy would cross one of my red lines.
For the project teams, the initial transfer would be without impediment, after which a probationary period could be employed before they are declared permanent. Those destined for centers of excellence would be assessed for competencies before transfer, as should those in the replacement pipeline for project execution teams or needed immediately to supplement under-resourced teams.
I also would set a red line at five centers of excellence as a minimum, these providing specialists in the following disciplines: risk treatment, structured collaboration, earned value management, continuous improvement (internal to DIA, leading the related rule reduction, process re-engineering and ongoing emerging technique analysis) and internal project review – the latter being the only ‘black hat’ center. Additional centers are assumed for industry engagement (including the defence industrial strategy implementation), parliamentary affairs, government internal liaison (with involved departments and agencies) and public affairs.
Transparency
While the rest of what is presented enables the potential for the common good, transparency educates and markets the DIA’s contribution to the common good.
A red line for me would be anything absent regular project briefs (at least semiannually) that follow a simple agenda: status report, issues of concern and action being taken, and the date of the next briefing. Furthermore, I would see a red line if three objectives were not met: managing expectations, qualifying all statements about the future as ‘uncertain’ (especially regarding delivery dates and project costs) and educating the public.
Staying In Assigned Lane
Red lines would be the DIA meddling in project requirements or in-service support defined by the Department of National Defence.
Risk Treatment
I would emphasize a red line that prevents reliance on risk registers with analysis leading to a categorization against heat maps. The pervasive use of risk registers creates an unwarranted level of complacency that can mask reality.
Anything other than an advanced risk treatment system would cross a red line for me. Such systems are amazing and available under license, such that one could be selected for use in all DIA projects.
Risk treatment would cater to the dynamic and emergent nature of risks, enlisting all personnel in each project enterprise to raise observations of anything going awry. As well, risky decisions would be included in the risk treatment system, whether made by governance or when sharing significant risks with contractors. Failure to pursue any of these would cross a red line.
In addition, three additional elements of risk treatment would be included: a mature earned value system, well-structured collaboration based on working jointly across the contract divide and formal stakeholder management by project execution team leaders.
Contracting
If left without direction, contract lawyers would pursue iron-clad contracts buried in Requests for Proposals meant to protect Canada from all risks by adopting these contracts without negotiation and allocating all risks to industry. Once contracts are issued, negotiation of amendments would be aggressively avoided.
This traditional legal approach erroneously assumes less risk to Canada and would be another red line issue for me. Contracts would always be flexible and open to negotiation, shared risk liability and amendment. Intellectual property would be pragmatically addressed to satisfy all parties based on an appropriate transfer or rights to Canada at the appropriate times which are often significantly after contract award.
Governance
My proposed red lines would ban a sole focus on oversight, ignorance of the details of the project risk treatment system, the use of scorecards for briefings and decisions based on time available.
While oversight is of paramount importance, situational leadership would support project execution teams with every brief ending with the question “how can we help you”.
Advanced risk management requires a detailed understanding of the emerging risks and complicated treatment scenarios that are best understood through immersion and leadership by a senior governance member. Failure to do so leads to endless questions searching for ground truth and oftentimes a loss of confidence in the execution team.
Scorecards mask changes in the probability of risks occurring until they are about to be realized. This leaves no time for exploration of mitigation options and instead demands immediate urgent damage control considerations.
DIA is fortunately starting with only a handful of procurement projects, but their mandate is to manage all projects over $100 million. During my tenure, there was insufficient time to properly delve into less than 20 such projects at senior governance meetings, which meant governance by exception and reliance on the brief by the project sponsor rather than the narrative of the project execution team leaders.
An External Brain Trust
I see a red line if DIA relies solely on its government personnel for new ideas – they are far too busy. I would create an external brain trust including the right representatives from defence industry and ex-government practitioners, academia and associations (e.g. CADSI and IAIC) from Canada, along with contacts internationally with applicable expertise. This avoids insularity leading to missed opportunities and an ‘us against them’ reaction to suggested changes from outside government. Such advisors would operate as much at the tactical as the strategic level, because progress happens based on tactics where ‘the devil is in the details’.
Do These Really Matter?
I swear by these as a group of red lines which could enable DIA to minimize harm to their acquisition projects’ desired outcomes – the best one can hope for because in the business of complexity there are never guarantees.
Armed with red lines, the DIA might borrow the United Kingdom’s May 2025 procurement target established for achieving timely major platform acquisition projects – ‘long-term strategic platforms (submarines, ships, aircraft) to shrink from six years to two’. Admittedly, that may be an unrealistic goal, but certainly a stretch target.
For an alternative opinion, the DIA could also confer with the Australia which has just announced the creation of a Defence Delivery Agency (DDA) by merging three existing groups and with a focus on speed of delivery. Such consultation could suggest walking back or waiving some of my proposed red lines because of downsides.
As I quoted recently in another article, Ben Franklin is famous for saying that “failing to prepare is preparing to fail’. Regardless of my proposals, I implore the DIA to prepare properly by selecting a set of red lines.