With the Canada First Defence Strategy (CFDS) a little over a year old and the Department of National Defence facing budget changes, Bill Pentney, Associate Deputy Minister, spoke with editors Bob Beaudoin and Chris Thatcher about the CFDS and the ongoing Strategic Review, and how they might affect the Canadian Forces as they prepare to withdraw from Afghanistan.
Are there aspects of the CFDS that need to be revisited in light of recent operations and/or the economy?
The CFDS was always meant to be a living document. When it was originally announced, the government said it was setting out a long-term plan for building the four core elements of Canadian military capability: growing the number of people, addressing equipment recapitalization, infrastructure and readiness. We’ve had a number of changes since then and our sense is that the government remains committed to the core of CFDS, the levels of ambition, the missions that are set out, and the underlying commitment to a balanced, long-term plan. Since the CFDS, we’ve had an investment plan approved, great successes in both civilian and military recruitment, new equipment, a significant number of infrastructure investments, and readiness has improved, though it continues to be a work in progress – overall readiness is up but there remain some imbalances created by the need internally to meet that level of readiness.
We continue to learn lessons about implementing CFDS, but there are a couple now that we have learned. One is driven by the need to adapt it to a new budget line. The CDS has announced the creation of the Chief of Transformation to examine the type of military headquarters we need. We have some elements to review on the departmental side and the institutional side. As an institution, we’ll have to learn to live with that long-term planning horizon, something no one in government has ever had to do before in terms of how to maintain and sustain a long-term planning framework: when you make an adjustment, how do you understand the first, second and third order consequences for the institution and for the plan over the long haul? We’ve adjusted our internal governance structure to get better at that. And I think you’ll see that the government will want to re-examine elements of CFDS at some point over the next year or two. But at this stage I wouldn’t think there will be changes to the fundamental core of CFDS.
The investment plan that the Chief of Programme is working on, is that more of a living document?
We’ve got a solid five-year plan. Coming out of the Strategic Review, we’re going to have to look at how we adjust that plan. However, the plan can’t drive the strategy. It still must be based on government priorities. We’ve done some things in response to immediate mission needs in Afghanistan that were consistent with that. We’ve purchased things out of sequence, if you like; outside of that mission we might have done them differently. And we’re going to see how technology evolves. In the last couple of years, we’ve learned a lot of lessons about what UAV technology can offer. We’re looking at advances in satellite technology and making investments in support of Canadian excellence in technology. But you’re right, the investment plan will always remain more of a living document. It will be adjusted more often then the CFDS because it must take account of those in-year adjustments.
The three role, six mission ideal of the CFDS was recently put to the test with simultaneous operations in Haiti, Vancouver and Afghanistan, among others: How did the strategy hold up?
We were glad we hadn’t written eight missions. We did five of the six missions in parallel through the month of February. The cumulative effect for the institution was quite remarkable. A couple of things stood out. One is the importance of having the capabilities. When the Haitian earthquake occurred we were able to react because we had trained troops and a system that was capable of delivering an immediate response: a loadmaster in Trenton who could stay up all night and get the load out the door; a couple of folks who worked 48 hours straight at CANOSCOM (Canadian Operational Support Command) to get the loads sorted. But the key was having Hercs and C-17 aircraft ready to go – we didn’t have to spend a long time trying to find ways of getting stuff to Haiti. Our ships were able to sail quickly. And we had troops that were trained and ready to go. There was a core set of planning assumptions around the levels of ambition and the missions, with the the expectation that the government would request CF support. With Haiti, we were able to get clarity about what we were going to do and get the authority to do it; some of the internal government paperwork caught up afterward. But it all starts with having core capabilities with the personnel ready to go and the structures in place. That provided a clear demonstration to Canadians of the importance of investing in a balanced way across the pillars. It also demonstrated the ability of the institution to provide a surge capacity and to sustain it – this wasn’t just dealing with a short-term flood. We had some early imagery that made clear the extent of the devastation, and it was clear it wasn’t going to be a two- or three-day mission.
Had those planning assumptions not been as well articulated, would this have been as possible?
I think the articulation probably captures a history of development within the Canadian Forces. If you go back to the ice storm, for example, the CF was a different organization with a different articulation of what government expected. Knowing the roles and missions we are expected to be ready for and being organized to deliver on those is a critical planning principle. There’s always a danger of a mismatch in terms of what we believe we’re able and ready to do and government expectations. And such a mismatch is bad for all sides. So having that clarity – knowing the kinds of missions we want to be able to do, having the CF tell us what equipment and support they need to do it, and then working on it together – that sequencing has been helpful, and I think it sets us up well for the next five to 10 years.
You are also in the midst of a Strategic Review: What will that tell you?
The Strategic Review is an opportunity to step back and look at the entire program, not just the things we are building now. Within government, it is an unique top to bottom examination of everything we’re doing, where our money is going, what activities are underway, and how well we are doing them. In an organization as big and complex as this, this forces you to look at it all and ask: why are we doing things this way? The Strategic Review asks, are we doing it well or is there a better way? One simple example is recruitment. A significant number of our recruits are now reaching us online. The Fight with the Canadian Forces campaign has helped characterize and define the armed forces. As an ad campaign it has been hugely effective because it got the right people doing the right things – contacting us. We’ve adapted to the change in technology. We have to look at how we do recruiting and where best to invest. How much training should we do in the field and how much should we do through simulation? It’s less expensive to train using simulators – we burn less fuel, there’s less wear and tear on equipment, a smaller environmental footprint, and exercises can be repeated again and again. The Strat Review gives us the opportunity to examine these kinds of activities. It’s also an opportunity to look at what we should stop doing. What should we shed? With this last budget, we know we have to make some strategic decisions.
What is the relationship between the Strategic Review and the new Chief of Transformation? Will they be working in tandem?
There is a logical consequence. The Australians have launched a similar initiative and found that a lean, effective and efficient defence institution that is agile and adaptable is a strategic national asset. Canada needs to deliver support to the military, and the way we can maximize capabilities is to be as lean, effective and adaptable as possible on the institutional side. The Chief of Transformation initiative is one of several that will help ensure that we are able to deliver on our commitment to those six missions and levels of ambition. We need to be able to support soldiers and to buy equipment in ways that meet the highest standards of accountability and transparency. I don’t want to put all of that on General Leslie’s shoulders, but he’s going to carry a big part of it. We’re going to need to supplement his activities with other activities that look at the whole institution as well. It’s not a civilian thing or a military thing, it’s an institutional thing.
Is there a sense yet of what a budget reduction might mean for your core programs?
It’s too early to say. There are some changes that will have to be absorbed. Overall, though, coming out of what we’ve been through and looking to the future in terms of being responsible stewards of the organization, we should take a deep breath, dust ourselves off and say, how can we do it better? I think the next stage of transformation is a little bit about that. The current commands have proved their worth; but is there a better way of delivering the kinds of command and control structures that would allow us to maximize output? That will be the question that General Leslie is going to noodle away on for a little while and for which solutions will have to be developed.
DND and the CF have been strong proponents of the whole-of-government approach to operations and have invested heavily in research and ideas around the Comprehensive Approach. Without the driver of Afghanistan, how will you ensure that new organizational structures remain in place? Does the interdepartmental model and expertise that has developed remain for future engagements?
A lot of what we have done has built capacity in the government as a whole. We now have hundreds of people at PCO, Treasury Board, Public Works, Finance, RCMP, CIDA and Foreign Affairs with on the ground experience, and we’ve got hundreds of colonels, lieutenant-colonels, captains and majors who have experience working with civilians in the field. I think the yardsticks have been moved. The next generation of leadership in all of these institutions is now in place. They have seen the complexity of the field and understand how they can and must work together. That’s something that doesn’t go away, whatever the context. We’re not certain where we’ll go next, but it is likely that it will be as part of a coalition and will require support from other government departments. Reviews of most recent conflicts suggest that winning the military battle is only the first stage. The ability to establish civil order, a basic sense of justice and some basic stability is really important, and it is where we bridge into a civilian capability. Efforts are underway to embed these lessons.
In Haiti, the military and civilian deployment and integration reflects those relationships. Who’s running START (Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force) at DFAIT? Elissa Golberg. Guess who she has worked with in Afghanistan? General Guy Laroche and the operational support command who understand what it is like to support CIDA and DFAIT while they are supporting the CF. All of those relationships now exist and will continue. We need to look at ways of institutionalizing these over the long haul. There are opportunities to work together in the field and to train together more at home.
As we prepared to deploy civilians into Afghanistan in much greater numbers and out beyond the wire, there was a significant discussion in Ottawa about our civilian duty of care toward those employees. We need the civilian support structures and the medical support structures. We also recognized that we need some of the military flexibility – people who could be deployed while others were trained to replace them from Canada. We’ve done a first round of that with Afghanistan and there are lessons being learned. But we all recognize that this is just the down payment. I don’t know that it needs changed institutional structures in government, but we must find ways to institutionalize it and improve it. Next year, the National Security Program will be about a third Canadian civilians, a third international military and a third Canadian Forces members. So you’ll have a group of people go through a pretty intense experience and learn some valuable lessons. Deploying civilians into difficult zones with the military is something we recognize is also a strategic national asset for Canada.
If the institution and the whole-of-government are two key components, the third leg of that stool is the industrial side. How do you see the relationship? Has it changed significantly over the last five years?
In the defence strategy, the government explicitly committed to trying to position Canadian industry for success on the world stage by helping industry know what is coming. The government also announced some really important changes to the industrial and regional benefits (IRB) policy last year that make it a way of not just getting a dollar-for-dollar return on a military investment but positioning some Canadian companies to gain access to a worldwide supply chain, allowing companies to bank IRB benefits over time rather than all on the back of a single procurement. That is a fundamental game changer and allows a much improved and longer term approach to IRBs for both government and industry. Clearly, there is a thirst among companies for greater awareness of long-term strategy, not just short-term procurements. We’re looking at how we can implement that more effectively. The shipbuilding consultation process provided an unique opportunity to bring together a wide range of stakeholders with four federal departments to engage in a meaningful dialogue that has led to a government shipbuilding strategy. That’s a tangible way in which new relationships are being built, all based on the platform of the long-term plan. Carrying that through other sectors is something we’re still working on. We have to look at ways of consulting with companies to give them more of a perspective of what our plans are. The Soldier System Technology Roadmap is a brillant example of what we need to do.
Finally, on a more personal note you joined DND from the Privy Council Office with a background in human rights law. How difficult was it to transition into what is undoubtedly a large and complex portfolio?
It was a fascinating experience. DND is Canada’s largest and most complex organization. It’s difficult to appreciate how blended it is until you are inside it. When my appointment was announced, somebody who had worked here before called me up and said, “Congratulations, you’re deputy mayor of a medium sized Canadian city. Oh, and you’ve got sewage problems.” I’ve now come to appreciate what he meant. I’ve never worked in a bigger place, but also I’ve never worked in a place that was so unified in purpose or pride. I’ve worked with a lot of people in other organizations who were proud of what they did, but the thing that has struck me most is that this place from top to bottom is hugely united and motivated and proud of what they are doing. They are absolutely committed to whatever their mission is, whether it’s Afghanistan or housing support or personnel support. I’ve been privileged to participate in a number of awards ceremonies and each of the award winners provides a remarkable story. Some are for team accomplishments but others have been for spending an entire career trying to make a frigate engine work better and being the one guy who could fly out to sea to repair a frigate engine on the verge of collapse. For me, in terms of the transition, it’s both awe inspiring and a little sobering to be at the top of such a huge institution.
An interview with Bill Pentney