Vanguard
News

Certainty and Complex Military Procurement Projects

A CC-177 Globemaster (701) from 429 Transport Squadron at 8 Wing/Canadian Forces Base Trenton sits in Hangar 7 at Pituffik Space Base, Greenland, in order to be ready for BOXTOP 25-II on November 2, 2025. Photo: Cpl Gwyneth Lovell, 8 Wing Imaging/Canadian Armed Forces

Regulation drives the certainty – Gavin Newsom

Laying the Groundwork

Let’s start with a definition of certainty often employed: the state of being completely confident about something.

People’s biases towards confidence and certainty (which eschews risk) and that of organizations vary widely:

Democracies face exceptionally complex challenges, and those who pursue governing tend to cautiously crave risk or are serious risk-takers. Certainty is fleeting if not nonexistent. Compromise is the governing principle, which often means that there is certainty about a degree of pain and reward for groups with different needs. This result is common in Canada’s far-flung regional communities with very different needs.

One pursuit of certainty should never be compromised in democracies. Abraham Maslow indicated this in 1943 with his Theory of Motivation (later called his Hierarchy of Needs). For those who govern, the personal security of its citizens from the multitude of threats to their wellbeing must be their top priority, that including the health of the Canadian Armed Forces. Without that certainty, citizens are traveling through life, much like driving through a city that is renowned for dangerous gangs at night, without an insurance policy or GPS.

Today, geopolitical and domestic threats to Canadians’ way of life are abundant. Addressing all these threats introduces a level of complexity yet to be mastered by any democracy.

If it is not yet obvious to the reader, everything stated above as certain is questionable. Nevertheless humour me and consider the foregoing as the current environment.

Enter Complex Projects

What do I mean by a complex project and why discuss them?

I have routinely relied on the broad definition employed by the International Centre for Complex Project Management (ICCPM), which defines it in five dimensions:

I believe it is important to add too other typical attributes. Such projects routinely have long life spans and are exceptionally expensive.

Why write this note? I observed over a decade with a portfolio of such procurement projects that all of these dimensions of complex projects were present to some degree in weapons systems platform acquisitions by the Canadian government. Begging Heisenberg’s forgiveness regarding his scientific Uncertainty Principle, I suggest that complex projects demonstrate his principle: you rarely know where a project really is in its journey and when it will deliver the target outcomes because these are uncertain. 

Some examples may make the point. A key political staff member insisted on a harebrain strategy, introducing years of delay. A requirement was levied for over six approvals to modify a pre-existing design by the Prime. A change of senior personnel created misalignment of influential stakeholders and weeks of confusion. The insistence that a truck project be broken into nine contracts took months to achieve a viable approach. Seniors with influence operated outside their lanes over years which led to project cancellations before contracts were to be awarded. These events (from my tally of over 25) all preceded the real work of construction approval.

Unlike the common belief about process regulated activities – including when tailoring complex project approaches – certainty is not an attribute amid complexity. As demonstrated above, unexpected risks emerge routinely and some even offer insufficient evidence to point towards a ‘best’ future. Nor is there certainty if you apply all the latest technique for taming complexity in projects, a fact that makes it difficult to gain adoption of complex project techniques. In essence, this is counter to what people believe (including Governor Newman) in terms of following processes to achieve certainty, let alone the maze developed over decades by a multitude of government authorities.

Most complexity theorists argue that every complex project is a unique risk environment. Thus such projects should be tailored to fit the expected challenges and execution team’s capabilities. An advantage to such tailoring is that this can avoid the lesson-based continual addition of unnecessary process complexity debt currently infecting weapons system platform acquisitions.

Leadership of complex project execution teams includes what is described above and more, but on steroids. However one focus stands out as critical to success – the judicious selection and preparation of the execution team, which includes selecting the processes to navigate the unforeseeable risks ahead. I and others argue that this up-front investment is more important than any other enablers of project success, including a focus on the sibling efficiency measures of cost and schedule. One of Ben Franklin’s quotes was never more valid than for complex projects: “By failing to prepare, you are preparing to fail”.

Because serious risk-takers are open-minded and comfortable considering risky scenarios, they are extremely valuable in complex project execution teams as part of the risk treatment team – but as a small part of that team. They complement the larger cadre of cautious risk-takers. 

In a somewhat related vein, those risk-takers who choose to join complex project execution teams crave the challenges of such endeavours – this being more hit and miss for those assigned. They expect and revel in a fast paced journey with many risky disruptions that will test the team’s ability to minimize the impacts of such surprises. I often describe such projects as collaborative activities of adaptation, characterized as back-to-back-to-back marathon relay races. For these people, such activity is in itself adequate reward.

Given the tremendously complex issues facing government leaders, those involved in government complex projects understand that government authorities may issue directions that are less than ‘best for project. Such challenges are seen as the necessary compromises between what the user community needs and what the investing stakeholder requires.

Notwithstanding the hierarchy of stakeholders, complex weapon systems platform acquisition personnel understand that all influential and interested stakeholders matter. These stakeholders can disrupt continually so as to slow progress significantly which may lead to cancellation. Execution team members therefore also value collaboration and transparency, activities that are too often difficult to achieve due to uncertainty. As recently highlighted by Philippe Lagassé in a Debating Canadian Defence post, it is important to understand that complex endeavours are best qualified with nuances (i.e. with the phrase ‘it depends’) because so much cannot be foreseen with certainty.

Looked at through a different lens, the day-to-day complexity of federal governing means that the procurement of ‘big things’ does not often get launched early enough to ensure proper preparation and effective implementation. Whether a weapons systems platform acquisition project or an infrastructure project of the current government’s Major Projects Office, they are complex and uncertain in many ways. This leads to two conclusions:

The Takeaway – Get Real With Expectations

The first takeaway was mentioned earlier but bears repeating – you have the right to disagree with my declarative statements about complex projects.

That said those experienced in complex military platform acquisition projects know that nothing is certain until a project is delivered and in-service for many years. Everything should be qualified as uncertain until that point. This is fundamental because of the myriad of stakeholders and the inherent challenges of technological advances that drive continual project disruptions.

The one certainty in this business that I support is that complex projects to build big things will all suffer from disruptive events. I am certain that their journey will be uncertain, no matter what Governor Newsom proclaimed about regulation.

This means that the essential job of project execution teams is to minimize the harm to the desired outcomes created by emerging risks.

While much can be accelerated without damage through the efforts of the new Defence Investment Agency, such uncertainty will not go away.  And given the current popularity of the word ‘investment’, you can take that to the bank.

Related posts

Chantier Davie selected by the Government of Canada as third shipbuilding partner under the NSS

Vanguard Staff
June 17, 2022

A New Era for the Canadian Armed Forces: Lieutenant-General Stephen Kelsey Takes the Helm as Vice Chief of the Defence Staff

Vanguard Staff
August 5, 2024

NATO Navy Customers: $1.1 Million Kraken Synthetic Aperture Sonar Order

Vanguard Staff
November 8, 2022
Exit mobile version