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Canadian Submarines – Whither the Arctic?

In the 2017 defence policy, Strong, Secure Engaged,[1] Canada reaffirmed its commitment to maintaining a submarine capability as part of a balanced Blue Water Navy; a navy that is capable of responding across the complete spectrum of maritime operations over a vast maritime estate. The understanding that submarines remain a key element of balanced naval forces is important and can be seen in their dramatic growth in their numbers worldwide, as more countries opt to acquire or expand upon a submarine  capability.[2] However, it is their unique role in protection of national security interests that is the determining factor – this was powerfully articulated in a recent speech outlining Australia’s Defence Strategic Update – a nation with remarkably similar challenges and requirements.[3]

All submarine operating nations acquire submarines that meet their specific requirements, which are usually defined by geography and fiscal resources. Not surprisingly, in order to maintain a presence in Canada’s three oceans, Canadian naval forces must be designed for operations that routinely face the most extreme of ocean conditions. Acknowledging the Pacific and Atlantic coasts are a demanding environment; the challenge is of course the Arctic, as it is covered in ice and prolonged operations under the ice require a submarine to be able to operate far from support facilities without having to surface. To date, this capability been the sole domain of the nuclear-powered submarine, as it demands air independent power generation and the amount of power that has heretofore only been capable of being generated by a nuclear reactor.[4]  

A Modern Submarine

Modern ocean-going submarines, be they nuclear or conventionally powered, are remarkably similar – what differs between the two is how they generate power. The front section of the submarine is where command and control is exercised from, equipment is operated, and the crew accommodated – a common feature that includes the same weapons and sensors suite regardless of the fitted power generation system, which typically occupies the stern section of the submarine. All that said, it is worthwhile to clarify some key points about submarines, particularly as they apply to under-ice operations.

Nuclear Power

Given the above, one would ask why does Canada not simply invest in a fleet of nuclear-powered submarines? As a nation with a domestic nuclear power generation industry there is no technical reason why Canada could not build and maintain nuclear-powered submarines. In fact, Canada has investigated acquiring nuclear submarines twice before, and in both cases the Government decided not to proceed because it was unaffordable, as it would have impacted other Canadian government initiatives. 

The cost of a nuclear-powered submarine fleet is driven by a multitude of factors, notably it is the magnitude of the supporting nuclear infrastructure, not the submarine itself, which determines the overall project costs. During the Canadian Submarine Acquisition Project – SSN in the late 1980s it was the substantial cost of the infrastructure, on both coasts, that was the determining factor in the decision not to proceed.[8] Often when costs of nuclear submarines are publicly cited, they reflect the unit cost to build a particular type of submarine, but they do not address the total costs of naval nuclear power. There were some other factors that influenced the decision process – let me explain:

The Dilemma

Understanding that it is very unlikely that Canada will invest in nuclear-powered submarines the question remains as to how will Canadian submarines patrol in all three oceans that border Canada? Much has been written of late of the evolution of non-nuclear submarine AIP, however, the fact remains that no AIP system in service today can meet the power requirements for long transits and prolonged operations beyond the ice edge. So, one may ask who will develop such a system?

Nations that operate nuclear submarines have invested considerable sums on nuclear infrastructure and are unlikely to be interested in funding development of an alternate power source. Conversely those nations that have developed non-nuclear AIP are nations that routinely operate their submarines close to home with easy access to supporting infrastructure and their national supply chain. By not having to go far from home and not having to operate under ice, the current AIP systems are adequate to meet the patrol requirements of these smaller submarines – but they are not reflective of the demands of Canadian geography.[11] Simply put, Canada requires a larger submarine than currently is in service with most navies, except those with nuclear-powered submarines. With the possible exception of Australia and the Netherlands, Canada would have to invest in the development of this technology on its own, which could prove to be cost prohibitive.[12]

A Potential Solution

In contemplating Canada’s dilemma, it is clear the ideal solution is unlikely to be forthcoming without significant investment by either government or industry. However, there are a number of areas that can significantly enhance submarine operations – these being power generation and storage plus unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs). All of these technologies have evolved considerably of late, but are not without their detractions and, as such, require further development. Specifically:

So, if a non-nuclear-powered Canadian submarine is restricted to ice-edge operations, does that mean it cannot patrol Canada’s Arctic waters? Conventional thinking would have one believe this, however, the evolution of unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) has been quietly developing over a number of decades and Canada has been a leader in its development from the onset. A patrolling submarine could launch and/or control a UUV from the ice edge and while this is proven technology, the challenges become:

Modern UUVs can perform a multitude of missions which include rapid hydrographic survey, Mine Countermeasures (MCM) – including Route Survey,[16] Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW), oceanography, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR), amongst others. Leveraging extant technology, UUVs can covertly and effectively help assert Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic and greatly expand the reach of a patrolling submarine – today.

The size of UUVs vary greatly from small man-portable variants to Heavy Weight Vehicles (HWV) – designed to fit inside a standard 533 mm torpedo tube, such as General Dynamics Bluefin [17] –  to large UUVs designed for long endurance and large payloads such as International Submarine Engineering’s Theseus UUV.[18]  In fact, Canada has set UUV under-ice records, with a vehicle spending 12 days under the ice, surveying close to 1,000 km, before being recovered.[19] So yes, UUVs are part of the future of undersea warfare and can be part of an under-ice patrol solution, however, they are not a panacea and loss or interruption of the mission must be expected. Moreover, there are some inherent factors that limit unrestricted UUV use in under ice operations. Specifically:

In addition to submarine launched and controlled UUVs, larger unmanned submarines are being developed to act as a “mother ship” for smaller UUVs. Known as Extra Large Unmanned Undersea Vehicles (XLUUV), such as Lockheed Martin’s ORCA, these are being developed to compliment submarine operations by allowing for greater undersea operational awareness, endurance measured in months and the ability to support various operations with different re-configurable payloads.[21]

In conclusion, the optimal submarine propulsion solution for the covert transit of large distances and protracted under ice operations remains with nuclear power for the foreseeable future. However, if Canada wishes to maximize the effectiveness of current and future non-nuclear powered submarines, then the answer will be a combination of evolving power generation and storage technology while maximizing existing UUV capabilities. In short, if Canada wants to go beyond ice-edge operations and conduct prolonged operations under the ice, it must either go nuclear or unmanned.


[1] https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/corporate/reports-publications/canada-defence-policy.html accessed 18 June 2020.

[2] https://www.forbes.com/sites/hisutton/2020/01/05/the-2020s-will-change-the-world-submarine-balance/#6fa61a695249 accessed 6 July 2020.

[3]  “Submarines are fundamentally important to our defence strategy. They are a unique – and powerful deterrent to any adversary, and they are critical to protecting our national security interests. Submarines secure Australia’s strategic advantage – through leading-edge surveillance and the protection of our maritime approaches”. 6 July 2020.

[4]  https://submarinesforaustralia.com.au/sea/wp-content/uploads/Australias-Future-Submarine-Insight-Economics-report-11-March-2020.pdf accessed 11 June 2020.  

[5]  “AIP is often described as Air-Independent Propulsion, however the term has become outdated. As well as propelling the submarine, AIP provides electrical power for ship systems including domestic needs, hence the term Air Independent Power.  Seehttp://www.hisutton.com/World%20survey%20of%20AIP%20submarines.html accessed 11 June 2020.

[6] Almost all naval nuclear reactors are Pressurized Water Reactors (PWR) using water as a coolant, however, there were some Soviet and one US submarine fitted with liquid metal cooled reactors which were problematic to operate and discontinued – see: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liquid_metal_cooled_reactoraccessed 11 June 2020.

[7] https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/navy-ships/a19681544/how-a-submarine-surfaces-through-ice/ accessed 11 June 2020.

[8] Gimblett, Richard H., ed. (2009). The Naval Service of Canada 1910–2010: The Centennial Story. Toronto: Dundurn Press, pgs 179-181 andhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Canada-class_submarine accessed 11 June 2020.

[9] The US Navy’s formidable nuclear safety record demanded an equal investment by Canada and was a major reason why the US was initially not supportive of Canada’s SSN programme. See: https://www.forbes.com/sites/jamesconca/2019/12/23/americas-nuclear-navy-still-the-masters-of-nuclear-power/#4f97dd666bcd accessed 11 June 2020.

[10] A CANDU reactor is a very large reactor which uses un-enriched uranium as a fuel with heavy water as a moderator whereas a submarine PWR is a very small reactor which uses enriched uranium as a fuel and ordinary water under pressure as a moderator see: https://cna.ca/technology/energy/candu-technology/and https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pressurized_water_reactor accessed 11 June 2020.

[11] For example, the transit distance from Halifax NS to Churchill MB is the same distance as a trans-Atlantic crossing from Halifax NS to the UK, which at an average transit speed of 8 knots would take 15 days. Note, AIP systems are designed for slower speeds (typically 5 knots) for covert patrolling.  http://ports.com/sea-route/#/?a=1559&b=155&c=Port%20of%20Halifax,%20Canada&d=Port%20of%20Plymouth,%20United%20Kingdom Accessed 8 July 2020

[12] Routine ice edge operations would demand a bigger hull, that is strengthened, to surface through ice in an emergency, as well as enhanced navigation and life support systems.  Moreover, operating in the Arctic requires total self-sufficiency as shore-based support is not available and the submarine must be large enough to carry sufficient fuel and stores, as well as being able to meet environmental regulations which preclude any discharge (e.g. large holding tanks).

[13] https://www.thyssenkrupp-marinesystems.com/en/hdw-fuel-cell-aip-system.html accessed 11 June 2020.

[14] https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2019/07/naval-group-achieves-breakthrough-with-its-fc2g-aip-system/ accessed 6 July 2020.

[15] https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/the-attack-class-submarine-battery-debate-science-fiction-or-engineering/ accessed 6 July 2020.

[16] “Route Survey is a Mine Counter Measure (MCM) technique that uses side scan sonars to determine optimal shipping route selection (in terms of ease of mine detection) through the pre-survey of all objects along these routes, and in times of conflict, the re-survey of these routes to find differences”. See: https://mosaichydro.com/sites/default/files/papers/MBES_in_Route_Survey.pdf accessed 11 June 2020.

[17] https://gdmissionsystems.com/products/underwater-vehicles/bluefin-12-unmanned-underwater-vehicle accessed 11 June 2020.

[18] https://ise.bc.ca/product/theseus-auv/ accessed 11 June 2020.

[19] https://www.researchgate.net/publication/224239582_12_days_under_ice_-_an_historic_AUV_deployment_in_the_Canadian_High_Arctic accessed 11 June 2020.

[20] https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a531594.pdf accessed 11 June 2020.

[21] https://www.militaryaerospace.com/computers/article/16722145/navy-starts-rampingup-production-of-large-unmanned-submarines-for-reconnaissance-and-special-ops accessed 8 July 2020.

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